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Case Comment
"It Takes More Than Money to Fly Delta. It Takes
Nerve.": Union Secondary Boycott Publicity and
the First Amendment: Delta Air Lines
In December of 1976, Delta Air Lines terminated a contract
for janitorial services with a union subcontractor.1 Delta replaced the union firm with Statewide Building Maintenance
Corporation, a non-union employer. Because of the loss of
Delta's business, the terminated firm was forced to lay off five
of its six employees who had worked at Delta's offices. 2 All
were members of the respondent Service Employees Union.3
In September of the following year, the union began to distribute leaflets calling for a consumer boycott of Delta. 4 Members of the Service Employees Union distributed handbills to
the public at Delta's facility at the Los Angeles International
Airport and in front of the company's downtown ticket office. 5
The union's campaign consisted of a sequence of four
handbills distributed over a six month period. In the case
which later arose from these events, the National Labor Relations Board labelled the handbills A, B, C, and D for the sake of
clarity. Handbills A and B were nearly identical. Handbill A
asked the public not to fly Delta because the company was "unfair" and did not "provide AFL-CIO conditions of employment."6 The other side of the handbill contained the assertion7
that "[i]t takes more than money to fly Delta. It takes nerve."
In support of this contention, the union set forth Delta's accident record for the preceding thirteen years and listed the
number of monthly consumer complaints and letters Delta had
1. Hospital & Serv. Employees Union Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263
N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 2, 111 L.R..M (BNA) 1159, 1160 (1982).
2. Id.
3. Id. The parties to the case that arose from Delta's actions stipulated
that following the layoff the union had a primary dispute with Statewide, the
non-union employer, but no primary dispute with Delta Air Lines. Id.
4. Id. at 3, 111 L.R.M. (BNA) at 1160.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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received between July, 1976 and July, 1977.8 The union correctly identified the sources of the information as the National
Transportation Board and the Civil Aeronautics Board.9 Handbill B did not contain the consumer complaint material but was
otherwise identical to A.1O Neither handbill mentioned the fact
that the union's primary labor dispute was with Delta's
janitorial subcontractor, rather than with Delta itself."
Handbill C, however, did call attention to this important
fact. It asked the public to boycott Delta because Delta had
caused union members to lose their jobs.12 In their place Delta
had hired "a maintenance company" that did not provide union
wages and standards.13 On the back, the handbill contained
the same accident and complaint material as had Handbill A.14
Handbill D was similar to C. This handbill, however, named
the maintenance company as Statewide.5 It also introduced
the accident and complaint material by stating that the union
was bringing this information to the public's attention "to publicize our primary dispute with . . . Statewide."16 The union
also announced the boycott to its own membership. It published Handbill A in the September editions of its two newspapers, and Handbill C in the October editions.' 7
The case came before a National Labor Relations Board
Administrative Law Judge on stipulated facts. The fact stipulation contained no reference to any effect, economic or otherwise, that the union's campaign had on Delta.'8 The complaint
charged the union with a violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of
the National Labor Relations Act.'9 The Administrative Law
Judge found all four handbills and both newspaper publica8. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. app. IV at 4-5.
9. Id. at 5.
10. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 3, 111 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 1160.
11. See 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. app. IV at 3-8, setting forth the information contained in the handbills.
12. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 4, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1160.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. app. IV at 13.
17. 263 N.LR.B. No. 153, slip op. at 4, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1160.
18. Id. at 6, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
19. Id. at 2, 111 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 1160. Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), in pertinent part, makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is...
forcing or requiring
any person . . . to cease doing business with any other person." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976) (emphasis added).
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tions unlawful. 20 The National Labor Relations Board affirmed,
holding that the publicity campaign constituted a secondary
boycott prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).21 The union had
undertaken the boycott with the forbidden secondary "object"
of forcing Delta to cease doing business with Statewide,22 and
the publicity had also "threaten[ed], coerc[ed], or restrain[ed]" Delta to that end.23 Moreover, no element of the

campaign was protected by the so-called '"publicity proviso" to
section 8(b) (4), which exempts some union messages from the
broad ban on secondary boycotts. 24 The proviso allows a union

to circulate secondary boycott publicity in a form "other than
picketing" if the union does so "for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public" of its primary labor dispute. 25 Here, the
Board concluded, the Service Employees had not informed the
public of Delta's accident record for this protected "purpose."
Rather, they had done so solely to bring economic pressure on
Delta.26 The publicity proviso therefore did not protect any element of the union's campaign. 27 Having found a violation of the
Labor Act, the Board majority refused to consider the union's
claim that its publicity was protected by the first amendment. 28
Hospital and Service Employees Local 399 (Delta Air Lines),
263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (1982).
20.

263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 2, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1160.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 6, 111 L.IR.M. (BNA) at 1161.
23. Id. at 5-6, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
24. Id. at 7-8, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161. The publicity proviso allows a
union to engage in "coercive" conduct otherwise proscribed by § 8(b) (4) if it
takes the form of ' publicity, other than picketing,for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization,
that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor

organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform
any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976) (emphasis added). The parties in Delta stipulated that the union's publicity had not had "an effect of inducing any
individual... to refuse to ... perform any services." 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153,
slip op. at 6, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161. Therefore, the case did not involve the
final portion of § 8(b) (4).
25. 29U.S.C. § 158(b)(8) (1976).
26. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 7, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
27. Id. at 8-12, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161-62.
28. Id. at 13-14, 111 IRR.M. (BNA) at 1163. The majority stated: "Since
we have found that Respondent's conduct is unlawful under Section 8(b) (4)
because it is coercive and engaged in for a secondary object, and is not saved
by the publicity proviso, we shall presume that our finding of a violation here is
in accordance with the Constitution ....

"

Id.
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Congress added the provisions of the Labor Act at issue in
Delta Air Lines in 1959 as part of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, commonly known as the LandrumGriffin amendments. 29 These modifications of section 8(b) (4)
were largely the result of a congressional attempt to plug "loopholes" in the secondary boycott provisions of the earlier TaftHartley Act.30 A secondary boycott in the most general sense
is an organized attempt to gain a concession or advantage from
one business by pressuring other businesses that trade with it,
usually through a concerted refusal to deal with the latter
firms. 31 Thus defined, the problem is not a new one, and at

common law such boycotts were generally illegal when en32
gaged in by organized labor.
The early federal labor acts had the effect of relaxing common law restrictions on secondary boycotts. The Norris-La
Guardia Act33 greatly restricted the power of the federal courts
to issue injunctions in labor disputes. The Supreme Court held
that federal courts were therefore prevented from enjoining
secondary boycotts by labor unions.

34

The Wagner Act35 con-

29. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 542-43 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976)).
30. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-167). Senator John F. Kennedy, chairman of the conference committee that agreed upon the final language of § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) and its two
provisos, stated that "[t]he chief effect of the conference agreement... will
be to plug loopholes in the secondary boycott provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act. There has never been any dispute about the desirability of plugging these artificial loopholes." 105 CONG. REc. 17,898 (1959). See also NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51 (1964).
31. Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycot, 45 CoxmLL L. Q. 724, 724 (1960) (citing F. F
NcruTER & N.
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930)). See also Note, Picketing and Publicity Under Section 8(b) (4) of the LMRA, 73 YALE L J. 1265, 1265 (1964).
32. Comment, supra note 31, at 724. See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438-39 (1911) (courts may enjoin boycotts even though
effected through spoken words or printed matter); C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAw 132-36 (3d ed. 1979). Secondary boycotts fared somewhat better in the courts when effected by business combinations. Id.
33. Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976)).
34. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-34 (1941). The precise
holding in Hutcheson was that § 20 of the Clayton Act, interpreted in light of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, required the Court to find that a union's primary and
secondary boycott activities were not in violation of the Sherman Act. The case
has traditionally been read to shelter peaceful labor secondary boycotts from
injunction. See R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAw 240 (1976); Segal, Differences Among Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Ac4 5 WAYNE L. REV.
195, 198 (1959).
35. Act of June 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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tained no union unfair labor practice provisions at all. Although unions remained liable for damages resulting from
secondary boycotts, and some state courts retained the power
to enjoin them,36 in 1947 Congress decided that these employer
remedies were insufficient. Congress therefore enacted the
Taft-Hartley Act that made union "secondary boycotts" a federal unfair labor practice. 37 Section 8 (b) (4) of Taft-Hartley prohibited unions from inducing a strike for the forbidden
secondary "object" of compelling an employer to cease doing
business with another.38
The Taft-Hartley prohibition proved in practice to be rather
narrow. A wide variety of secondary pressures by unions remained lawful, as a number of unions discovered. Some strike
activities were quite clearly within the spirit of the Taft-Hartley
prohibition, but not within its language. 39 Other forms of secondary pressure that did not involve a call to strike were also
beyond the reach of Taft-Hartley4o but were less obviously the
36. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 491-96 (1949)
(upholding state court injunction against secondary picketing held to violate
state antitrust law); Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 724-28
(1942) (same). See also R. GoRmAN, supra note 34, at 240.
37. Comment, supra note 31, at 725.
38. Ch. 120, 61 Stat 141 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)).
See also Comment, supra note 31, at 725.
39. The Taft-Hartley Act, for example, only prohibited a union from calling
a strike by the "employees" of an "employer" for a secondary object 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (1976). Unions therefore remained free to induce secondary strikes
by workers who were employees as defined by the dictionary, but not the Labor Act. Thus, because workers subject to the Railway Labor Act and tho.e
employed in agriculture were not "employees" under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1976), secondary strikes by these workers were not prohibited. Comment, supra note 31, at 737. See generally Note, "Legal" Secondary Boycotts:
Effect of the General Definitions Section of the Taft Hartley Act on the Secondary Boycott Section, 41 MnN. L. RaV. 452 (1957).
Furthermore, unions were not precluded from encouraging a single employee to cease work, because § 8(b) (4) forbade only the inducement of "concerted activities." NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671
(1951); Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 606, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1953). Finally, Taft-Hartley did not outlaw direct pressure on a secondary business itself, even by means of threatening to call out its employees, as long as the
union did not "induce" the employees themselves to job action. Local Union 49,
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, (Driver-Miller Plumbing & Heating Corp.), 124
N.L.R.B. 888, 892 (1959); Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, (Sand Door &
Plywood Co.), 113 NJ.LR.B. 1210, 1215 (1955), enforced, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). See Comment, supra note 31,
at 726.
40. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J.). Justice Frankfurter stated.
Whatever may have been said in Congress preceding the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act concerning the evil of all forms of "secondary boycotts" and the desirability of outlawing them, it is clear that no such

1240

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1235

result of loopholes in the law. It was not illegal, for example,
for a union to appeal solely to customers to refuse to buy the
products of a struck primary employer.41 Nor did the Act forbid a union from calling a consumer boycott of a secondary firm
because it continued to deal with the disfavored primary firm.42
In 1959, some members of Congress believed that the Act
should also prohibit these secondary boycott appeals directed
at the general public. 43 The sponsors of the Landrum-Grifflin
bill in the House of Representatives proposed to deter these
union activities by adding a new subsection (ii) to section
8(b) (4) of the Act. This addition would make it unlawful for a
union to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce" with the forbidden secondary "object" of compelling any business to cease trading with any other business 44
Much of the congressional debate over Landrum-Griffin fosweeping prohibition was in fact enacted in § 8(b) (4) (A). The section
does not speak generally of secondary boycotts. It describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objectives ....
[Section 8(b) (4) ] aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict... by
prohibiting... the coercion of neutral employers... through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals
to handle goods.
Id. at 98-100. See generally Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes
and Boycotts--Another Chapter, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1959).
41. If the union expressed its appeal in the form of a picket line, the Board
usually found it a per se "inducement" of secondary employees. Teamsters Local No. 795 (Grant-Billingsley Fruit Co.), 127 N.L.R.B. 50, 61 (1960); Dry Cleaning Drivers Local No. 928 (Southern Service Co.), 118 N.L.R.B. 1435, 1437,
enforced, 262 F.2d. 617 (9th Cir. 1958). The burden was then on the union to
show that its appeal was directed solely at customers. If the union did so, even
a picketing appeal did not violate Taft-Hartley. NLRB v. Local 50, Bakery
Workers, 245 F.2d 542, 546-49 (2d Cir. 1957). See Segal, supra note 34, at 200, 208;
Comment, supra note 31, at 730-31.
42. Comment, supra note 31, at 726-27.
43. Congressman Griffin explained the mischief at which his bill was directed in the following terms:
We are concerned about [union] picketing at a store where the [struck
product] is sold. Under the present law, if the picketing happens to be
at the employee entrance so that clearly the purpose of the picketing is
to induce the employees of the secondary employer not to handle the
products of the primary employer, the boycott could be enjoined.
However, if the picketing happened to be around at the customer
entrance, and if the purpose of the picketing were to coerce the employer not to handle those goods, then under the present law, because
of technical interpretations, the boycott would not be covered.
[Under the proposed Landrum-Griffin bill], [i]f the purpose of the
picketing is to coerce or to restrain the employer of that second establishment, to get him not to do business with the manufacturer-then
such a boycott could be stopped.
105 CONG. REC. 15,673 (1959) (quoted in Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the
Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 MwN. L. REv. 479, 494-95
(1965)).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976).
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cused on the bill's first amendment implications. Supporters of
Landrum-Griffin and similar bills concentrated on the problem
of union picketing at a secondary employer's place of business. 45 They argued that a picket line around the facility of an
employer who had nothing to do with the union's dispute was
unfairly "coercive" and should be banned. Opponents, on the
other hand, thought the language of the bill was sufficiently
broad to outlaw all union publicity that had a secondary object.46 They believed that secondary boycott appeals in the
form of handbills, newspaper or radio advertisements, or in any
other form might constitute unlawful "coerc[ion] or restrain [t]" of the secondary business.47 The opposition considered such an extensive prohibition a "basic infringement upon
freedom of expression." 48 They also believed the prohibition
went far beyond the plugging of loopholes in existing law and
added a new and remarkably broad restriction on union speech
that Taft-Hartley had never contemplated. 4 9
If the opponents of Landrum-Griffin were correct in concluding that the bill reached beyond picketing and banned all
forms of seconday boycott publicity, their constitutional concerns were well founded. The Supreme Court had allowed
much greater legal restraint on labor picketing than other publicity in the form of "pure" speech. Despite the broad protection initially accorded to picketing in the Supreme Court's
decision in Thornhill v. Alabama,5 0 the view that labor picketing is something "more" than free speech rapidly gained
45. See, e.g., supra note 43. See also 105 CONG. REC. 6428 (1959) (remarks
of Senator Goldwater), 6666-67 (remarks of Senator McClellan).
46. Congressmen Udall and Thompson, opponents of the bill, added their
analysis to the formal record.
The bill provides that a union may not restrain an employer where an

object is to require him to cease doing business with any other employer. The prohibition reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio
broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering with
freedom of speech.
[A]s I understand it, one of the acknowledged purposes of [the
proposed § (ii) of Landrum-Griffin outlawing "coercion or restraint" of
secondary firms] is to prevent unions from appealing to the general
public as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute.
This is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression.
105 CONG. REc. 15,540 (1959) (quoted in Lewis,'upra note 43, at 495). See also
105 CONG. REc. 6231-32 (1959) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
47. 105 CONG. REc. 15,540 (1959). See also id. at 6232-33 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
48. See supra note 46.
49. See infra note 72.
50. 310 U.S. 88, 101-05 (1940).
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ground on the Court soon after that case was handed down.
While the government's power to restrict "pure" speech based
on its content remained strictly limited, state power over picketing steadily expanded.5 ' Picketing, the Court found, involved
conduct as well as speech. 52 It had a force that did not depend
on the cogency of the ideas the picket signs expressed and "signalled" action on the part of others no matter what message appeared on the placards. 53 The Court also expressed the view
that some "secondary" picketing in particular involved "little, if
any, 'communication.' "54 Thus, regulation of labor picketing
was not subject to the stringent first amendment requirements
which apply to most other forms of expression55 In Carpenters
& Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 56 a
case of great significance for the Landrum-Griffin bill, the Court
also held that a state could validly ban secondary picketing in
order to "insulate from [a labor] dispute an establishment
which industrially has no connection with the dispute."5 7
If the bill reached beyond picketing to other forms of publicity, however, it confronted far stricter constitutional requirements.
Under modern first amendment doctrine, the
government may forbid expression in the form of "pure"
speech only in very limited circumstances. 58 Proponents of
such restrictions bear a particularly heavy burden when "pure"
speech is prohibited because of its content59 rather than the
"time, place, or manner" in which it is presented. 6O In general,
51. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 287-93 (1957).
52. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1949);
Bakery & Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas,

J., concurring).
53. The classic rationale for the distinction between picketing and other
forms of publicity was that supplied by Justice Douglas:

Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective
of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those
aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation.
Bakery & Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas,

J., concurring).
54. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 290
(1957).

55. See supra notes 51-54. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 58-68.
56. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
57. Id. at 727.
58. See L. TRiBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2 (1978).
59. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-95 (1977);
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
60. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402-09 (1953); Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 80-82 (1949).
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the first amendment embodies the principle that "government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
61
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
There are two exceptions to this general rule. One is based
on the category of speech the government seeks to regulate or
prohibit. Thus, a relatively modest showing of need may justify
a content-based restriction if the type of expression in question
is considered less favored in the general scheme of first amendment values. 62 Examples of these categorical exceptions include obscenity, "fighting words," 63 and purely commercial
speech such as product advertising. 64
The other exception to the rule against content-based
restrictions finds its justification solely in the adverse consequences that may flow from particular forms of speech in particular circumstances. Thus, even if the expression in question
is of a type that normally receives strict first amendment protection, it may be restricted when the evils likely to follow from
it are relatively certain, immediate, and serious. 65 This form of
regulation is premised on the notion that the government may
suppress some messages because of the effect they are likely to
have on their hearers, and thus may indirectly control conduct
by regulating the information and ideas available to the public.
This justification is especially suspect under the first amend66
ment because of its obvious potential for government abuse.
67
Consequently, any such restraint must be narrowly drawn
and must serve a compelling state interest. 68
61. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
62. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
63. Id. 'There are cetain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the

profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words."'
64. Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). The
Court has had some difficulty in defining "commercial speech," as well as in determining its constitutional status under the first amendment. The Court has
variously defined such speech as that which does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction," that which "propos[es] a commercial transaction,"

and "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience." Comment, Standard of Review For Regulations of Commercial
Speech: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66 MIN. L. REV. 903, 919 n.84
(1982).
65. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); L.
TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-9.
66. L. TRmE, supra note 58, § 12-2.
67. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); L.TRIBE, supra note 58,

§ 12-8.

68. The general rule in such cases is stated as follows by Professor Tribe:
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Opponents of the Landrum-Griffin bill were therefore
rightly concerned that the broad scope of the bill's prohibition
would violate the first amendment. If the bill proscribed nonpicketing union publicity as unlawfully "coercive," it was
clearly a content-based restriction. 6 9 It applied to union publicity in any form, and thus could not have come within the "labor
picketing" exception as a regulation of the "manner" of expression.70 Finally, it was not clear that the state's interest in protecting neutral employers was sufficient to outlaw "pure" union
publicity.
On the contrary, at least one member of the
Supreme Court had suggested that peaceful secondary boycott
appeals by unions were fully protected by the first
7
amendment. 1
Congressional debate on union free speech and other issues continued in the House-Senate conference. The Senate's
Democratic conferees attempted to narrow the bill's ban on
union publicity. 72 The conference committee eventually agreed
on a compromise version of the bill. New section 8(b) (4) (ii) reIn order to establish that particular expressive activities are not protected by the first amendment, the defenders of a regulation which is
aimed at the communicatve impact of the expression have the burden
of either coming within one of the narrow categorical exceptions [such
as obscenity, "fighting words," etc.] or showing that the regulation is
necessary to further a "compelling state interest."
L. TA E, supra note 58, § 12-8. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 94-97 (1977); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (dicta).
69. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
71. Senator Humphrey, an opponent of Landrum-Griffln, quoted the dicta
of Justice Stone in United States v. Hutcheson. From the floor, he saidI ask the Senate to hold with Chief Justice Stone that the "publication,
unaccompanied by violence, of a notice that the employer is unfair to
organized labor and requesting the public not to patronize him [or her]
is an exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment which cannot be made unlawful by act of Congress."
105 CONG. REC. 6232 (1959) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) (quoting United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 243 (1941) (Stone, J., concurring)).
72. Senator Kennedy characterized the response of the Senate's Democratic conferees to the original Landrum-Griffin bilh
I speak respectfully of the bill which was passed by the other body, but
it seems to me that there were serious shortcomings in the reform bill
which passed the House, and the conferees on the Democratic side ...
shared my view that we could not under any circumstances have voted
for the Landrum-Griffin bill.
When we view the significant provisions of the Landrum-Griffin bill
..
in my opinion we must admit that they go far beyond reform ....
[T] he House bill would have prohibited the union from carrying on any
kind of activity to disseminate informational material to secondary
sites. They could not say that there was a strike in a primary plant.
We quite obviously are opposed to their affecting liberties in a secondary strike or affecting employees joining, but the House language
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tained the original House language that made it unlawful for a
union to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce" for the forbidden secondary "object" of forcing one
business to cease trading with another.73 Appended to section
8(b) (4), however, was a "publicity proviso," which directed that
nothing contained in [section 8(b) (4)] shall be construed to prohibit
publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization,
that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom
the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer.74

The drafters of the publicity proviso were unable to convince
proponents of the original bill to allow secondary consumer
picketing.75 They were able to secure some protection for secondary "publicity, other than picketing," 76 but that protection
seemed quite narrow. The proviso's protection extended only
to non-picketing appeals informing the public that a secondary
employer distributed the products of a disfavored primary producer. In any case, the conference had clearly recognized the
important distinction between picketing and other forms of
publicity. The Act's new prohibition extended to secondary
consumer picketing, at least where it was "coerc[ive]." The
general ban on coercion or restraint, however, did not outlaw
union publicity in other forms that met the requirements of the
proviso.
The threshold question in any case arising under a statute
forbidding coercion or restraint is, of course, whether the challenged conduct falls within the fair reach of those terms. The
now famous Tree Fruits case 77 is central to an understanding of
the approach of the Board and of the courts to the concept of
"coercion" under the Landrum-Griffm amendments. In Tree
Fruits, the union had engaged in consumer picketing in support of its strike against a group of fruit packers and-warehousemen. 78 Union members picketed Safeway food stores in
prohibited not only secondary picketing, but even the handing out of
handbills or even taking out an advertisement in a newspaper.
105 CONG. REC. 17,719-20 (1959).

73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976).
74. Id.§158(b)(4).
75. See id. "We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit
picketing in front of [the] secondary shop." 105 CONG. REC. 17,898-99 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976).
77. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits Labor Relations
Comm., Inc.), 132 NJ.LRB. 1172 (1961), rev, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962), va-

cate4 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
78. 132 N.L.R.B. at 1174-76.

1246

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1235

Seattle, Washington, because Safeway sold the "struck product," Washington State apples. The union's picket signs and
handbills carefully asked only that consumers refuse to buy the
struck product, and not that they refrain from shopping at
Safeway.7 9 The question before the' Board was whether such
'product picketing" calling only for a boycott of the struck
product amounted to "coercion" of the secondary retailer that
sold it.80 The case came before the Board entirely on stipulated
facts. The stipulation included no information concerning the
actual effect the picketing may have had on Safeway's retail
business generally, or even on its apple sales. 81 The complaint

alleged, inter alia, a violation of new section 8 (b) (4) (ii), forbidding the direct "coerc[ion] or restrain[t]" of the secondary
82
employer.
The Board held that the union had violated this new section. It had "coerce[d] or restrain[ed]" Safeway directly because the "natural and foreseeable result of such picketing, if
successful, would be to force or require Safeway to reduce or to
discontinue altogether its purchases of [Washington State] apples." 83 Because the union had intended this result, it had vio-

84
lated Landrum-Griffin's prohibitions on secondary picketing.
On a petition to enforce the Board's order, the circuit court
rejected what it termed the Board's "per se" approach to coercion or restraint under section 8 (b) (4) (ii) .85 Although picketing had traditionally been subject to far stricter regulation than
handbilling or other "pure" speech, 8 6 the court doubted that
Congress could constitutionally forbid all secondary picketing

79. The union pickets wore placards that read: 'TO THE CONSUMER.
NON-UNION WASHINGTON STATE APPLES ARE BEING SOLD AT THIS
STORE. PLEASE DO NOT PURCHASE SUCH APPLES. THANK YOU.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 760, YAKIMA, WASHINGTON." Id. at 1175. The union
also distributed handbills that told consumers that the 1960 Washington State
apple crop was being packed by non-union firms. Id. The union gave written
instructions to all pickets directing them not to interfere with any deliveries or
with Safeway's employees. They were not to state to anyone that Safeway was
on strike or unfair, nor were they to ask any consumer not to shop at Safeway.
Id. at 1174-75.
80. Id. at 1177.
81. Id. at 1172-76.
82. Id. at 1173.
83. Id. at 1177.
84. Id. at 1177-78.
85. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
86. See supra note 53. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 290 (1957); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
499 (1949).
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on the theory that it constituted per se "coerc[ion] or restrain [t]" of the secondary firm.87 The court suggested that the
Board could ban even peaceful picketing when it had caused or
was likely to cause substantial economic injury to the secondary employer.8 8 This, however, was a matter of fact requiring
proof, and the Board had taken no evidence on this issue. The
court therefore remanded the case to the Board with instructions that the Board take evidence on whether the picketing
89
had coerced or restrained Safeway "in fact."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected both
conclusions reached below. The Court agreed that the statute
raised potentially serious first amendment problems and stated
that it would not infer a congressional intent to impose a
"broad ban" on peaceful picketing absent the "clearest indication in the legislative history" of such an intent.9 0 The Court
instead ascribed to Congress a policy of dealing narrowly with
"isolated evils" in this "sensitive area."91 The majority then
concluded that consumer picketing which limited its boycott
appeal to the struck or disfavored product did not present the
secondary "abuses" that Congress had sought to outlaw. While
such picketing was clearly "secondary" in nature, it was nonetheless "closely confined to the primary dispute" 92 because the
public was asked "only to boycott the primary employer's
goods." 93 The Court also decided, based on a somewhat tortured reading of the legislative history,94 that the requisite
87. 308 F.2d at 316. The court noted that the union had taken successful

steps "to prevent its picketing from having the customary 'signal' effect" on the
employees of the secondary. Id. (emphasis in original). The picketing in Tree

Fruits may therefore have been "closer to the core notion of constitutionally
protected free speech than the picketing the Supreme Court has held may be
banned," because such an appeal was directed solely at the general public. Id.
See supra notes 4041.
88. 308 F.2d at 317.
89. Id. at 318.
90. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964)
(quoting NLRB v. Drivers, Local Union No. 639 (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274, 284
(1960)).

91. 377 U.S. at 63-64.
92. Id. at 72.
93. Id. at 63.
94. The Court noted that Congressman Griffin had not listed consumer
picketing among the evils his bill was directed at when he first introduced it.
Id. at 67 (citing 105 CONG. REC. 15,531-32 (1959)). When Congressman Griffin
later addressed the issue he referred only to picketing that called for a total
boycott of the secondary firm. 377 U.S. at 67-68 (citing 105 CONG. REc. 15,673
(1959)). See supra note 43. Thus, the Court attributed to Congress a clear intent only to ban picketing that asked the public not to do any business with the
secondary firm. 377 U.S. at 70-71. The Court then confronted the argument that
the language of the publicity proviso, specifically excluding picketing from the
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clear intent to ban such picketing had not emerged.9 5 Therefore, the Court held that consumer picketing limited to the disfavored product did not "threaten, coerce, or restrain" the
secondary business and fell entirely outside the proscription of
section 8(b)(4)(ii).96 Such picketing did not depend, as it
97
hardly could have, on the publicity proviso for protection.
The three dispositions of the Tree Fruits case explored the
three major possible approaches to "coerc[ion] or restrain[t]"
under section 8(b)(4)(ii). A union's campaign could be coercive per se, as the Labor Board had concluded; its coerciveness
could depend on the facts of the case, as the District of Columbia Circuit had suggested; or, as the Supreme Court declared, it
could be non-coercive per se.
The Supreme Court in Tree Fruits narrowed the reach of
the statute's ban on "coercion" expressly to avoid the constitutional problems a broad reading might present. The Board,
however, refused to extend this reasoning beyond the facts of
that case. Picketing appeals that followed the struck product
were allowed only if, as in Tree Fruits, consumers could boycott
the primary product without boycotting the secondary employer altogether. Thus, where the secondary firm depended in
large part on the primary product for its revenue,9 8 or the priarea of protection, indicated that Congress considered all secondary picketing
coercive. In meeting this argument the Court relied on a statement of Senator

Kennedy. The proviso, he said, preserved "[t] he right to appeal to consumers
by methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from buying goods
made by nonunion labor and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells
such goods." Id. at 70 (quoting 105 CONG. REc. 17,898 (1959) (emphasis added
by the Court)). The Court concluded that the proviso could have been added

in order to protect nonpicketing publicity that asked consumers to boycott both
the struck product and the secondary firm that sold it. 377 U.S. at 70-71. The
proviso's wording did not compel the conclusion that Congress found all secondary picketing coercive. It only meant that secondary picketing calling for a total boycott of the secondary was within the congressional definition of
"coercion or restraint." Id. Dissenting Justice Harlan thought the majority, in
emphasizing the word "and" in Senator Kennedy's remark, was "grasping at
straws, if indeed the phrase relied on may not equally well lend itself to a disjunctive reading." Id. at 87 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95. 377 U.S. at 71.
96. Id. at 71-73.
97. The proviso protects only publicity "other than picketing." See supra
note 24.
98. But see Local 14055, United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Dow Chemical Co.),
524 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1975), ("In our view the [Tree Fruits] decision...

may not be limited in its application to a factual situation in which the struck
product constitutes only a small part of the business of the secondary retailer
...
."), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). This problem had been anticipated by Justice Harlan in his Tree Fruits dissent. See 377 U.S. at 83
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court finally settled the issue in NLRB
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mary product became "merged" with that of the secondary, 99
picketing of the secondary remained illegal because a successful boycott of the primary product would have the same effect
as a total boycott of the secondary firm. Significantly, the
Board refused to treat non-picketing secondary boycott publicity any differently. The Board saw no difference between picketing and other publicity as a matter of "coerc[ion] or
restrain [t]." All secondary publicity as defined by the Act remained coercive per se in cases beyond the narrow holding of
the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits.0 0
While the Board's conclusion on the issue of "coercion"
generally has been predictable, the reasoning used to reach it
has rarely been clear. In Middle South,1o for example, the
Board found the union's campaign coercive because it
"threatened economic retaliation against the [secondary] firms
by seeking to induce individuals not to trade with the listed
firms." 02 The fact that a few such firms acted in accord with
union wishes "demonstrated" the existence of coercion.103 This
reasoning is ambiguous because it is not clear whether the actual effects on the secondary firms are relevant to the determination. The Board may have held the union's campaign
v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607
(1980). The Court held that union picketing in such a case would be unlawful
where the secondary appeal "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral
parties with ruin or substantial loss." Id. at 614-15.
99. See, e.g., American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1969);
Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952, 955-57 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
100. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Labor Board's first Great Western decision, and remanded the case to the Board for elaboration, inter alia, of the
meaning of "coercion or restraint" under the Act. Great W. Broadcasting Corp.
v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591, 600 (9th Cir. 1962). See infra note 113. The union in
Great Western had distributed leaflets calling for a secondary boycott and had
warned other firms that their names would be added to the boycott list if they
continued to deal with the primary employer. The union did not, however, engage in any picketing. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, Local 55
(Great W. Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 468-69 (1964). The Board, on
these facts, found the actions coercive, and employed several verbal formulations of the per se test in explaining why this was so. The Board found that the
union's activities were coercive because they were "part of a campaign calculated to bring economic pressure upon" the secondary firms, id. at 469, because
the activities were "directed toward the institution of a boycott," id. at 471, and
because the union's "object was the institution of a total boycott," id. at 470.
See also International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139 (Oak Constr. Inc.),
226 N.L.R.B. 759, 765 (1976) (union's handbilling campaign coercive because it
was "designed to harass" the secondary firm).
101. Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs (Middle S. Broadcasting Co.), 133
N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961).
102. Id. at 1714.
103. Id.
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coercive because the foreseeable and likely effects on the secondary businesses, such as significant economic loss, made it
so. If this reading of the case is correct, the fact that a number
of firms ceased trading with the primary is relevant to the issue
of what those foreseeable effects were. The union had
"threatened" economic loss in fact, because its campaign was
likely to cause such loss. On the other hand, the union may
have violated the Act merely by "seeking to induce" a boycott.
If so, the actual effects of its campaign would be irrelevant; it
would suffice that the union had circulated publicity with a forbidden secondary "object" or intent. 0 4
The Board's analysis in Tree Fruits 0 5 presents this ambi-

guity in a slightly different form. The Board found the challenged picketing coercive because its "natural and forseeable
result, if successful,"106 would be to compel some action on the
part of the secondary. This reasoning appears to emphasize
the foreseeable effects of the union's campaign. The further
qualification for "success," however, indicates that this apparent emphasis is misleading. The Board did not find the union
campaign coercive in the case before it. Rather, it found that a
hypothetical "successful" campaign would be coercive. One
may assume, of course, that unions always intend their campaigns to be successful. Just as clearly, some of them will in
fact fail. The Board's reasoning in Tree Fruits thus suggests
that it is the union's aim which makes its actions coercive,
rather than the foreseeable effects of those actions themselves.O7 The distinction between an "effects" and an "intent"
test has important ramifications for a case like Delta Air Lines,
where at least a portion of the union's campaign was unlikely
to have more than a negligible economic impact on the secondary's business.108
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976). See also supra note 19.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
106. 132 N.L.R.B. at 1177.
107. The view that the statute outlaws boycotts that would be coercive "if
successful," and therefore bans all picketing that has a secondary "object," was
expressly adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 639
(1980). The circuit court reversed a Board holding that partly relied on a lack
of economic effect on the secondary to find that the primary employer's product
had not become "merged" with that of the secondary. See United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 832 (Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co.), 236 N..R.B.
1525, 1527 (1978). The Court stated that the Board should have ignored the actual effect of the picketing, and "should have restricted its inquiry to the likely
result of the union's appeal if it had accomplished its object, a boycott of the
[primary product]." 647 F.2d at 639.
108. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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If the Board finds that union conduct constitutes
"coerc[ion]" forbidden by the statute, it must then decide
whether the publicity proviso protects any portion of the
union's campaign. The publicity proviso makes the form of the
union's appeal crucial. It exempts from the statute's broad ban
on union coercion only "publicity, other than picketing."109
Such publicity will normally take the form of "pure" speech,
however, and thus should be entitled to full first amendment
protection.110 Because Landrum-Griffin's ban on "coerc[ion]"
aims at the content of union expression,"' its restrictions on
non-picketing publicity must be narrowly drawn to serve a
compelling state interest.112 The scope of the proviso's protection is therefore critical to the constitutionality of section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Board has often expressly recognized
this."13 While continuing to label all secondary boycott publicity not covered by Tree Fruits coercive per se, the Board has
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976). See supra note 24.
110. See supra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 200.
112. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
113. In American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, Local 55 (Great W.
Broadcasting), 150 N.L.R.B. 467 (1964), the Board found a secondary boycott of
the customers of a struck radio station protected by the proviso. Id. at 472. The
Board stated that "Tree Fruits demonstrated the propriety of avoiding the constitutional problem in this difficult area, if possible. Our interpretation of the
proviso does so." Id. at 472 n.14. The Board reiterated this view in United
Steelworkers, AFL-CIO (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102 n.33 (1979).
The circuit courts have expressly endorsed the Board's practice of construing the proviso broadly in order to avoid first amendment problems. Indeed, in
at least two cases under the proviso, the circuit courts ordered the Board to
consider the first amendment issue. Those courts, at least, thought the Constitution applied to administrative law, unlike the Board majority in Delta Air
Lines, see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit initially
rejected the Board's broad reading of the publicity proviso announced in the
first Great Western decision. See American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists,
Local 55 (Great W. Broadcasting Corp.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1617, rev'd sub. noma.
Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962). The circuit
court remanded the case to the Board to elaborate on the statutory meaning of
"coercion," and also indicated that the Board should consider whether the
union's activities were protected by the first amendment. 310 F.2d at 600.
Before the Board rehearing occurred, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964). That decision
tended to support an expansive interpretation of the proviso. Id. at 54-56. Indeed, the Court stated that the proviso was as broad as "the prohibition to
which it is an exception," thus apparently allowing unions to conduct any type
of secondary boycott through non-picketing publicity. Id. at 55. The Board on
remand therefore reaffirmed its holding that the publicity in Great Western fell
within the proviso's protection, and found it unnecessary to reach the first
amendment issue. 'That issue would rise only if we found the actions were coercive and not protected by the proviso to [§ 8(b) (4) of] the Act." American
Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, Local 55 (Great W. Broadcasting Corp.), 150
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sought to avoid collision with the first amendment by greatly
expanding the area of protection the proviso affords to nonpicketing union publicity.114 The Board has often suggested
that its broad reading of the proviso is based on the legislative
intent underlying the proviso's somewhat confusing language. 1 5 Some of the Board's holdings under the proviso seem
to reflect that intent."16 Others, however, would be anomalous
as a matter of statutory interpretation were the Board not con17
sciously attempting to avoid grave first amendment issues.l
N.L.R.B. 467, 472 (1964). This time the circuit court upheld the Board. See
Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1966).
The Eighth Circuit recently gave the Board less equivocal instructions in
an analogous situation. The United Steelworkers had mounted a handbilling
campaign calling for a boycott of a nationwide conglomerate in support of a
strike against a small subsidiary of the company. The NLRB Regional Director
sought and was denied an injunction against the literature in federal district
court. Solien v. United Steelworkers, 449 F. Supp. 580, 583 (1978). The Director
appealed while unfair labor practice charges were pending before the Board on
the same facts. The circuit court reversed with instructions that if the district
court found, inter alia, reasonable cause to believe that the Steelworkers' campaign constituted an unlawful "secondary boycott," an injunction should enter.
Solien v. United Steelworkers, 593 F.2d 82, 88 (8th Cir. 1979). The court noted,
however, that the union's claims of first amendment protection were "not insubstantial, and the question of their validity must at some stage of this controversy be decided." Id. at 88 n.3. The court therefore directed that "[tihe Board
should consider the [constitutional] claims in question and its determinations
" Id.
with respect to them will be subject to review here ....
114. See supra note 113. See also infra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
115. See Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs (Middle S. Broadcasting Co.),
133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 1704-05 (1961).
116. In Middle South, the Board held that the proviso protects a nonpicketing appeal for a total consumer boycott of the secondary firm. The trial examiner quoted Senator Kennedy's request that the Senate instruct him and his
fellow Senate conferees to insist on some "necessary limitations" on the reach
of Landrum-Griffin. Among these was that "[w] orkers would not be denied...
the traditional right to ask the public not to patronize one who sells nonunion
goods of a manufacturer engaged in a labor dispute." 133 N.L.R.B. at 1716
(quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,334 (1959) (emphasis added by the trial examiner)).
Senator Kennedy also later explained to the Senate that "the Senate conferees
(c) The right to appeal
insisted that the report secure the following rights: ...
to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from
buying goods made by nonunion labor and to refrainfrom trading with a retailer who sells such goods." 133 N.L.R.B. at 1716 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,898
(1959) (emphasis added by the Board)).
117. Senator Kennedy rather clearly stated his belief that the proviso protected only appeals to the public involving "goods made by nonunion labor."
105 CONG. REC. 17,898 (1959). This is supported by the language of the proviso,
which is expressly limited to appeals that advise the public that certain "products" are "produced" by the primary and "distributed" by the secondary. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976). The Board, however, has not read the proviso to impose this limitation. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text. In Middle
South, the Board held that the proviso protected a call to boycott all secondaries who advertisied on a struck radio station. 133 N.L.R.B. at 1705-06. Plainly
the primary radio station did not, at least in a traditional sense, "produce" a
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The language of the proviso only allows a union to circulate
publicity "for the purpose" of informing the public of its primary dispute and the secondary's relationship to that dispute.n 8 Nevertheless, the Board has consistently held that the
proviso protects an appeal for a total boycott of the secondary
firm." 9 It is difficult to see how such an appeal could be "for
the purpose of truthfully advising the public" of anything. The
proviso expressly protects only a union's assertion that certain
'products" are "produced" by a primary firm and are "distributed" by another.120 Yet the Board has found publicity campaigns lawful where the primary employer "produces" no
"product," as well as where the secondary employer "distrib12 1
utes" none.
Despite the proviso's limitation to "truthful" publicity, the
Board has long held that 100 percent accuracy is not required.122 The union's handbills need only be substantially
23
truthful and distributed without an "intent to deceive."'
Handbills may even "advise" the public of the primary dispute
when they fail to name the primary firm altogether.124 Apparently, the publicity must only make it relatively clear that the
union's dispute is secondary in nature.125 Before Delta Air
Lines, the definitive reading of the proviso appears to have
"product" "distributed" by all the secondary firms that advertised on it. One
dissenting member of the Board was moved to mixed metaphor in response.
He accused the majority of "add[ing] fuel to their fire of statutory emasculation." Id. at 1708 (Rodgers, M., dissenting).
118. 29 U.S.C § 158(b)(4) (1976).
119. See, e.g., Central Ind. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (K-Mart Corp.),
257 N.L.R.B. 86, 89 (1981); American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, Local
55 (Great W. Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 472 (1964); Local 662, Radio
& Television Eng'rs (Middle S. Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 1704-05

(1961).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976).
121. See supra note 117.
122. Teamsters, Local 537 (Jack Lohman d/b/a Lohman Sales Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. 901, 906, 920-21 (1961).
123. Id. at 920.
124. See Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council (The Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp.), 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 703-05 (1980). See also Central Ind. Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (K-Mart Corp.), 257 N.L.R.B. 86, 89 (1981).
125. Two members of the Board in Delta Air Lines cast doubt on the continued validity of this rule. Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter agreed
that the union publicity in Delta was unlawful because in contained coercive
and unrelated information about the secondary firm. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip
op. at 11 n.13, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1162 n.13. They therefore found it unnecessary to consider whether Handbill C, which failed to name the primary employer, sufficiently identified the primary labor dispute. Id. They also stated
they did not have occasion to "pass on the Board's holdings in" The Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), or K-Mart Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 86

(1981).
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26
been that announced by the Board in Oak Construction,Inc. 1
27
and recently reaffirmed in K-Mart Corp.1
The proviso per-

mits "truthful publicity, other than picketing, which persuades
customers of a secondary employer to stop trading with it
......
128 While this interpretation is supportable as a matter
of free speech, 2 9 it rather clearly writes a number of the proviso's words of limitation entirely out of the Act.130
Given the Board's prior application of the coercion prohibition and the publicity proviso of section 8(b) (4), Delta Air
Lines is significant for several reasons. In dealing with the issue of the "coerciveness" of consumer boycotts under section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B), the Board's attempt to explain and justify the
traditional approach to this issue resolves to some extent the
ambiguities that infused the earlier decisions.'31 The Board's
strict reading of the publicity proviso in Delta Air Lines, on the
other hand, represents a dramatic departure from prior law.132
In connection with its narrow reading of the proviso, the Board
announced a perplexing new attitude toward construction of
the statute to avoid constitutional issues. 33 The issues of "coercive" publicity and the proviso's protection of it are, of
course, related. In Delta Air Lines, the Board's narrow construction of the proviso focuses attention on its traditional,
broad approach to coercion or restraint. The case raises serious first amendment questions about the Board's rule that all
secondary union publicity, even in the form of "pure" speech,
"coerc [es] or restrain [s]" secondary employers.
The majority in DeltaAir Lines took the Board's traditional
approach to the issue of statutory "coercion" in the consumer
boycott area. The majority had little trouble finding all the
handbills and both newspaper advertisements presumptively
"coercive" of Delta, the secondary firm. They did, however,
have some difficulty in explaining precisely why this was so.
The majority initially stated that the publicity had coerced the
airline because it was "designed to bring economic pressure on
Delta" for a secondary object. 3 4 This is clearly a union intent
126. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139 (Oak Constr., Inc.),
226 N.LR.B. 759, 759-60 (1976).
127. 257 N.L.R.B. 86, 89 (1981).
128. Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. at 759.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 200-10.
130. See supra note 117.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
132. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
134. 263 N.LR.B. No. 153, slip op. at 6, 111 L.R.PLM. (BNA) at 1161.
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standard. The union coerced Delta because its campaign was
35
"designed" to do so.1
In a later footnote, however, the majority asserted that a
union coerces or restrains an employer when it "imposes economic pressure against [the] secondary firm.'U3 6 This is rather
plainly an "effects" standard. Under this test a union's campaign would have to succeed in imposing some palpable economic pressure before it could be outlawed. Finally, in
explaining specifically why the boycott messages in the union's
own newspapers were coercive, the majority employed yet a
third formulation. The advertisements coerced Delta because
37
they were "part of" the union's effort to institute a boycott.
"[B]y publishing Handbills A and C and carrying its appeal to
a broader segment of the public, [the union] clearly expanded
the scope of the primary dispute. Since the effect of the newspaper advertisements is to enmesh Delta in the primary dispute between [the union] and Statewide," the majority
concluded that the union had coerced Delta Air Lines within
the meaning of the Act.138
Member Jenkins dissented from the majority's holding that
the publication of Handbills A and C in the union's internal
newspapers was coercive. He rejected the majority's "union intent" approach. In his view the question of coercion went "not
to Respondent's motives 'but to the nature and foreseeable consequences of the pressure which the union actually placed' on
Delta."139 Member Jenkins believed that the advertisements
were unlikely to have more than a "trivial" effect on Delta's
1 40
business. Indeed, the majority did not argue the contrary.
Therefore, Member Jenkins would have held that the publications were not "attended by the abuses at which the statute
135. Id. See also supra note 100.
136. Id. at 12 n.14, 111 L.R.LM. (BNA) at 1162 n.14.
137. Id.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 30, 111 L.R.M. (BNA) at 1167 (Jenkins, M., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB
(Monarch Long Beach Corp.), 657 F.2d 1252, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
140. Id. at 12 n.14, 111 L.&R.M. (BNA) at 1162 n.14. The majority found
Member Jenkins's view "contrary to both the statute and reality." Id. The
newspaper advertisements had coerced Delta because they "expanded" the
dispute and "enmeshed" Delta in it. Id. Because these concepts merely restate the Board's legal conclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 169-72, the
role played by "reality" in this discussion is not clear. The Board majority did
not, at any rate, argue that the newspaper ads were likely to cause any significant economic harm to Delta Air Lines.
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was directed,"141 and thus did not "coerce or restrain" Delta
within the meaning of the Act. Although the issue was one of
statutory construction, he also felt that a proper adherence to
first amendment principles compelled his narrower
approach.142
The second major issue in the case was whether the
union's campaign was to any extent protected by the publicity
proviso to section 8(b) (4).143 All members of the Board agreed

that neither Handbill A nor B was protected. These handbills
contained only the assertion that Delta was unfair, together
with the claim that it took "nerve" to fly on one of the company's planes. At a minimum, however, the statutory language
required that such publicity inform the public of the union's
primary dispute. 4 4 Because neither of these handbills did so,
neither was protected.145
The Board majority, with member Zimmerman dissenting,
held that Handbills C and D were similarly unprotected. While
both may have sufficiently identified the primary dispute, they
also contained the accident and consumer complaint information about Delta which was unrelated to that dispute.146 Delta
failed to support its claim before the Board that its safety record was as good as that of any other airline. The Board therefore assumed not only that the information was truthful but
that it was not even misleading as to the relative safety of
Delta's flights.147 Nevertheless, the union had violated the Act
because it had not distributed the information "for the [protected] purpose of truthfully advising the public" of the primary labor dispute. 4 8 The Board held that a union may
circulate what it called "coercive information" only for this
'"purpose."1' 49 Although the Board did not define "coercive information," union messages "attacking a secondary employer
on grounds.., unrelated to the primary dispute" were within
the definition and prohibited.150
141. 263 N.LR.B. No. 153, slip op. at 30, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1167 (Jenkins,
M., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 31, 1I L.R.M. (BNA) at 1167 (Jenkins, M., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976).
144. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 6, 111 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
145. Id. at 7, l1 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
146. Id. Cf supra note 125.
147. Id. at 5 n.7, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1160 n.7.
148. Id. at 10, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
149. Id. at 9, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1162.
150. Id. at 9, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
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In support of its holding the majority noted the similarity
between the union handbills in Delta Air Lines and those at issue in the Supreme Court's Jefferson Standard'51 decision. In
Jefferson Standard, the union had attacked a primary employer's product in handbills that contained no reference to the
ongoing labor dispute. The employer fired those responsible in
retaliation. The Board 152 and the Supreme Court5s3 refused to
find the dismissals to be an unfair labor practice. The Supreme
Court held that the union's publicity campaign had constituted
"such detrimental disloyalty" to the business that it was "good
cause" for discharge, 5 4 and beyond the pale of the Act's protection in section 7 for "concerted activities."155 In Delta Air
Lines, the Board read Jefferson Standard to hold that union
publicity is not protected by section 7 of the Act in the absence
of a "nexus" between the content of the publicity and a labor
dispute. 156 The handbills in Delta were not protected by the
publicity proviso because the information about Delta Air
57
Lines lacked this nexus.1
Member Zimmerman dissented from the holding that
Handbills C and D violated the Act. He argued that the proviso
required only that the union identify the primary dispute.
Once that "purpose" was fulfilled, the union could add what information it chose in support of its boycott appeal, at least
where such information was truthful.158 Handbills C and D informed the public of the primary dispute and contained only
truthful information. Their distribution and Handbill C's publication were therefore within his reading of the publicity proviso.159 Member Zimmerman found support in the legislative
history for this reading. 6 0 He also thought the first amend151. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346
U.S. 464 (1953).
152. 94 N.LR.B. 1507, 1511 (1951).
153. 346 U.S. at 477.

154. Id.
155.
156.

See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
263 N.LR.B. No. 153, slip op. at 11 n.12, 111 LILM. (BNA) at 1162 n.12.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 34, 111 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 1168 (Zimmerman, M., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 50, 111 L.ILM. (BNA) at 1172 (Zimmerman, M., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 35-42, 111 LR.RM. (BNA) at 1168-70 (Zimmerman, M., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Member Zimmerman noted that "the legislative
history of the publicity proviso is limited essentially to two statements by then
Senator John F. Kennedy." I&L at 35, 111 L.R.RLM. (BNA) at 1168. One states
that the House bill reached non-picketing publicity and "thereby interfer[ed]
with freedom of speech." Id. (citing 105 CONG. REC. 16,591 (1959)). The other
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ment imposed upon the Board a duty to construe the proviso
broadly, and found the majority's refusal to consider the Constitution an "alarming and acknowledged" departure from settled Board practice.161
The majority refused to consider the first amendment issues raised by Delta Air Lines. The majority noted that as an
administrative agency, the Board must presume the constitutionality of the statute it is charged with administering. 62 The
Board therefore stated that it would also presume the constitutionality of its own finding of a violation of that statute in the
case before it.163 The majority responded to the union's first
amendment arguments by ignoring them. Both Member Jencontains the aisertion that the publicity proviso allows unions to "carry on all
publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site." Id.
at 36, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1168 (quoting 105 CONG. REc. 17,899 (1959)).
161. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 46, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1171 (Zimmerman, M., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 13, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1163.
163. Id. The Board majority's approach to this issue borders on the incomprehensible. Courts have, of course, traditionally denied administrative agencies the power to declare statutes unconstitutional. See Note, The Authority of
Administrative Agencies to Considerthe Constitutionalityof Statutes, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 1682, 1682 n.1 (1977) and cases cited thereii. The duty of an agency to
consider constitutional claims properly before it, however, and the power to
construe statutes to avoid constitutional issues has rarely been questioned. See
id at 1688 n.34 and cases cited therein. In at least two cases under the section
of the Labor Act at issue in Delta Air Lines, the circuit courts have expressly
endorsed the view that the Board should consider the Constitution in interpreting the Act. See supra note 113. Indeed, it would have been surprising had they
done otherwise. In both of these cases, as well as in others under this section,
the Board explicitly responded by construing the publicity proviso broadly to
avoid potential constitutional conflict. See supra note 113. Indeed, in a case
arising under another section of the Act, the Board went so far as to refuse to
reach an unconstitutional result even though it thought the "mandatory language" of the Act required that result. Bekins Moving & Storage, 211 N.L.R.B.
138, 139 (1974). By contrast, the majority in Delta Air Lines simply refused to
consider the matter. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 14, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1163. They stated explicitly that they "shall presume that our finding of a violation here is in accordance with the Constitution." Id.
The majority rightly asserted that an administrative agency should presume the constitutionality of the statute it is charged with administering. Id. at
13, 111 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 1163. But it does not follow that it may also "presume" the constitutionality of its own holding. The Board here bluntly stated
that it will refuse to consider the Constitution when it finds a violation of the
Act. The doctrine that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional issues, however, only comes into play when there has arguably been a violation
of law. No tribunal needs to resort to such a doctrine where clearly no party
before it has violated any statute. If the Board intends to "presume" that every
violation of law it pronounces accords with the Constitution, it is difficult to see
what is left of this rule of statutory construction. The Board nowhere explained why it apparently feels at liberty to disregard the Constitution until
squarely overruled by a federal court. This attitude is, however, very nearly
lawless.
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kins and Member Zimmerman, on the other hand, believed that
the Constitution imposes constraints on the Board's construction of the statute.16 4
The majority's analysis of statutory "coercion" in the consumer boycott area is revealing. The Board stated that a union
engages in coercion when it "imposes economic pressure" on a
secondary firm. 65 The majority then asserted that the union
had done so in Delta Air Lines.166 This would surely be an acceptable definition of coercion had it been announced in a different case. If the Board finds on evidence that a union has
caused economic injury to a secondary firm, it may indeed conclude that coercion or restraint is present. Unfortunately, however, the Board in Delta simply knew nothing about whether
the Service Employees Union "imposed economic pressure" on
Delta Air Lines or anyone else. The parties produced no evidence on this issue, and the Board required none. 167 Thus it is
misleading to imply, as this passage does, that a violation of the
Act turned on the "effect" of the union's campaign on Delta's
68
business.
The Board was less misleading in explaining why the advertisements in the union's newspapers coerced Delta. They
did so because they "enmeshed" Delta in the union's primary
dispute.169 Again, however, this is true regardless of whether
the union caused any economic injury to the secondary, or
even whether any economic harm was likely. Since the Board
requires no such showing of palpable harm, it may easily find
that any true "secondary" boycott publicity has unlawfully "enmeshed" the secondary firm in the union's dispute in a metaphysical or emotional sense.
The Board also found the advertisements coercive because
they "expanded the scope of the primary dispute" by "carrying
[the union's appeal] to a broader segment of the public."'7 0 As
Member Jenkins pointed out in dissent, however, it seems
strange to say that a communication between parties to a dispute broadens its scope.17' The union and its membership
164. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 31, 111 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 1167 (Jenkins,
M., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 45, 111 L.Rl.LM. (BNA) at
1171 (Zimmerman, M., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 12 n.14, 111 L.RRM. (BNA) at 1162 n.14.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 12 n.14, 111 LR.R.M (BNA) at 1162 n.14.
Id.
Id. at 13 n.14, 111 LR.RLM. (BNA) at 1163 n.14.
Id. at 30, 111 L.R-.M. (BNA) at 1167 (Jenkins, 1VL, concurring in part
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were clearly parties to the primary labor dispute in the case.
On the other hand, the majority's reference to the "public" indicates a concern that the newspapers might fall into the hands
of non-members as well. This may of course happen. If it does,
the publication will have broadened the dispute beyond what it
would have been without the publication. That, however, is
true of every communication of a boycott message. This analysis therefore does little more than restate the majority's initial
conclusion that any and all secondary boycott publicity "coerces" the targeted secondary business.
Thus it seems that the majority's analysis of "coercion"
ends where it began: the union's campaign coerced Delta because it was part of an effort "designed" to induce a boycott. 7 2
The union intended to reduce Delta's business, and therefore
coerced or restrained an international air carrier. The conclusion seems inescapable that mere publication of a boycott call
with the requisite intent will violate federal law, unless the
message falls within the protection of the publicity proviso.
While there must surely be a limit to this rationale, it is not at
all clear where that will be. Perhaps the circulation of a boycott message among members of a union's executive committee
would not be illegal. If the same message were communicated
to the union's members at a general membership meeting, let
alone at a large meeting on the national level, a union might
pass the line of legality. Surely one could argue that such communications "enmeshed" the secondary firm or expanded the
dispute, given the application of those concepts in Delta Air
Lines. There is in principle no obvious stopping point to the
Board's rationale.
Despite these questions about the reach of the Board's
"union intent" view of coercion, that analysis has to an extent
dispelled the confusion created by the earlier cases. 7 3 The
Board traditionally at least discussed the "foreseeable" or
"likely" effects of .a union's campaign on the secondary business, even if the part these concepts played in the decisions
was never very clear.174 By contrast, the majority in Delta Air
Lines appears unconcerned with the actual effects of union
propaganda. Their analysis, when stripped of its legal labels,
and dissenting in part). Member Jenkins stated that the 1959 amendments
were aimed at "preventing the expansion of labor disputes beyond the principal combatants." Id.
172. Id. at 6, 111 L.IR.M. (BNA) at 1161. See also supra note 100.
173. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
174. See Tree Fruits,132 NJ.LR.B. at 1177-78.
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makes "coercion" of the secondary employer turn entirely on
the intent of the union.17 5 Any secondary publicity as the Act
defines it will be coercive per se. This approach is admittedly
more straightforward than some earlier formulations of the coercion standard. The Board's position, however, is wholly unacceptable on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
Legally, "coercion" means the use of some power to overbear the will of another. 7 6 "Restraint" is the abridgement of
liberty.177 The Board should read the terms "coerce" and "restrain" in section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) in their normal legal sense unless it clearly appears that Congress intended another
meaning.178 On this view a union would "coerce" a secondary
business only it if imposed, or was likely to succeed in imposing, sufficient economic harm to compel a reasonable employer
to take some action against its will. Surely some secondary
publicity, such as the union newspaper notices in Delta Air
Lines, would not have this effect. While a company may not
like what union newspapers say about the firm, it cannot claim
to have been "coerced" by the union's words merely because it
has been displeased or embarrassed by them.
The Board may believe, however, that Congress indeed intended the terms "coerce" and "restrain" to have other than
their normal meanings. Lurking behind the Board's analysis
may be the view that because Congress exempted some "publicity" from its ban on "coercion," Congress considered all secondary publicity coercive. If this form of statutory
interpretation in fact underlies the Board's position, 79 how175. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
176. BLACK's LAw DIcTioNARY 324 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citing Metro-Goldwyn
Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Cocke, 56 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)).
177. BLACK'S LAw DicrIoNARY 1477 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
178. "The law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense."
Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395 (1920) (Holmes, J.). "Words of art
bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of their habitat whether it be
a phrase of technical significance in the scientific or business world, or whether
it be loaded with the recondite connotations of feudalism." Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLuM. L REV. 527, 537 (1947).
179. In support of its holding that the union's newspaper advertisements coerced Delta, the Board points out that "[tilie publicity proviso expressly provides that for the purposes of section 8(b)(4) the term 'public' includes
members of a labor organization." 263 NJ..R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 13 n.14, 111
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1163 n.14. Although the Board does not make clear what relevance it believes this has, it seems that the language of the publicity proviso
could support the Board's view of coercion only via the opposite inference outlined in the text. The majority here seems to assert that because publicity
within the proviso's protection when directed at "Members of a labor organization" is protected, publicity outside that area directed at them is prohibited. If
this is indeed the inference the majority draws from the proviso's language, its
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ever, it is open to a number of criticisms.
This reading of the statute is in no way compelled by the
statutory language itself. The publicity proviso's exception
does indicate that Congress thought some secondary publicity
might be coercive. It does not follow from this that Congress
believed all such publicity was coercive. Moreover, to the extent that the Board relies on the proviso to define "coercion," it
relies on the meaning ascribed to that term by the opponents of
Landrum-Griffin.18o The strongest support for the Board's view
in the legislative history also comes from those who opposed
the entire section. 181 The "fears of the opposition" are hardly
authoritative sources for the interpretation of the "coerce or restrain" clause. Absent a clearer indication of Congressional inauthors would probably be unpleasantly surprised. It seems far more reasonable to suppose that the proviso's Senate drafters wanted merely to insure that
the word "public" was not read to exclude union members, and thus to deny
protection to any publicity directed at them. The irony in the Board's use of
this language is apparent. The Supreme Court properly rejected this artificial
approach to statutory interpretation in Tree Fruits: "[I]t does not follow from
the fact that some coercive conduct was protected by the proviso, that the exception 'other than picketing' indicates that Congress had determined that all
consumer picketing was coercive." 377 U.S. at 69. Although the Court's treatment of the legislative history concerning labor picketing in Tree Fruits is
strained, see Kroger Co. v. NL4B, 647 F.2d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting), its rejection of this form of interpretation seems well warranted.
180. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 46, 72. A statement of Congressman Griffin, explaining
the effect of his bill on "coercion" for a recognitional objective, although not
clear, lends some support to the Board's view-:
We must look to the purpose of the picketing in the particular situation
...
where an object of the picketing is [recognitional], then the picketing in that case would be illegal ....
This is subject, however, to the
constitutional right of free speech. Unless the picketing is for the coercive purpose indicated, [that of compelling the employer to coerce its
employees to join the union] it would not be affected by this language.
In other words, whether it is the handing out handbills [sic] or putting
an ad in the paper or picketing, if it is done in such a way as clearly to
be nothing more than an exercise of free speech, then the provision
would not be violated.
105 CONG. REC. 15,673 (1959). This could be read to mean that if handbilling or
newspaper advertisements had a secondary purpose, they would be "more than
an exercise of free speech" and would then be unlawful. On the other hand,
the Congressman's reference to the "way" in which such messages are circulated indicates that perhaps some genuinely coercive effects are needed before
such campaigns become "more than. . . free speech." In any event, Congressman Griffin appears to have shared the view of many in Congress that labor
picketing was the very essence of "coercion." See supra notes 43, 45. Senator
McClellan introduced a bill that would have made it unlawful for a union to
"exert or attempt to exert any economic or other coercion against" any business for a forbidden object. This proposal, however, was not adopted. See 105
CONG. REC. 6666 (1959) (emphasis added). Cf. i& at 19,849 (remarks of Senator
Dirksen).
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tent, the Board should not ascribe this unusual meaning to the
term "coerce."
Even if the Board's interpretation of "coercion" is an accurate reflection of Congressional intent, serious constitutional
problems with this reading remain. This construction of Landrum-Griffin imposes content regulation on all union secondary
publicity, and outlaws all that fails to comply. These burdensome restrictions on speech are constitutional only if they directly and narrowly serve the state's interest in protecting
neutral businesses from actual coercive harm.182 In labelling
all secondary publicity unlawfully "coercive," the Board ignores this constitutional constraint. Plainly some union publicity, such as the union's newspaper advertisements in Delta Air
Lines, does not reasonably threaten significant economic harm
to anyone. The state has no interest in regulating speech
where this is true.183 The Board's approach leads it to suppress
union speech on the mere complaint of any business. The
Board's per se rule is therefore unconstitutional because in a
substantial number of cases it leads to suppression of union
speech where the state has no interest, or an insufficient interest, in the prohibition.184
Not only does the Board's approach to "coercion" run afoul
of the first amendment; its narrow reading of the proviso fails
to mitigate that unconstitutional result. Of course even a broad
reading of the proviso will not protect all publicity that the
state has no interest in prohibiting. Under the Board's rule
that all secondary publicity is per se coercive, some publicity
that does not actually threaten neutral businesses with significant economic harm will be banned no matter what reading of
the proviso is adopted. Nevertheless, a broad interpretation of
182. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title
Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Carpenters
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725-27 (1942); Cox, Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court4 94 HARv. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1980).
183. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 565 (1980) ('The State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the
asserted state interest .... "); First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95

(1978).
184. See Delta Air Lines, 263 NJR.B. No. 153, slip op. at 30-31, 111 T.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1167 (Jenkins, M., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As
noted above, the majority in Delta Air Lines did not disagree with Member Jenkins's factual conclusion that the internal union newspaper messages there
were unlikely to cause significant losses to Delta. See supra text accompanying
note 140. In Oak Constr., Inc., 226 NX..R.B. at 759, it was proved that the union's
campaign asking customers to refuse to pay part of their phone bill had imposed permanent economic harm on the Wisconsin Telephone Company of
about thirty dollars. The primary employer was the charging party. Id.
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the proviso can substantially reduce the burden on union free
speech imposed by the Act. It also seems clear that the
Board's traditional broad approach to the publicity proviso has
contributed substantially to Landrum-Griffin's constitutional
survival.
In this context, the Board's refusal to consider the Constitution in deciding Delta Air Lines is troubling. Their reliance
on Jefferson Standard185 demonstrates the sincerity of this refusal, even if it demonstrates little else. The two cases differ
fundamentally, however. The Jefferson Standard holding that
some pure speech may be grounds for dismissal from private
employment in no way implies that the same speech, for the
same reasons, may also violate federal law. 86 Private employers are simply not subject to the constraints of the first amendment. 8 7 At least before Delta Air Lines, the federal
government was bound by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court's holding in Jefferson Standard is therefore wholly irrelevant to the issues presented in Delta. Only the Board's total
disregard for the Constitution explains its failure to see this
crucial distinction.
In addition to offending first amendment values, the
Board's narrow reading of the publicity proviso in Delta Air
Lines is unsupportable purely as a matter of statutory construction. Legislative compromise, of course, often presents
difficulties for those who must interpret its products,188 and
section 8(b) (4) presents this truth in stark fashion.189 When
185. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346
U.S. 464 (1953).
186. Most obviously, the often crucial element of state action is missing in
the former case. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-21 (1976).
187. Id.
188. Senator Kennedy presented the bill to the Senate unenthusiastically:
"[N] o one is fully satisfied with the product of compromise ....
This bill is a
compromise ..... [W]e have before us. . . what I believe to be the only bill
that it is possible to obtain under all the circumstances." 105 CONG. Rac. 17,898
(1959). See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970) (Harlan, J.):
The background of § 402(a) (23) [of the Social Security Amendments of
1967] reveals little except that we have before us a child born of the
silent union of legislative compromise. Thus, Congress, as it frequently
does, has voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to the courts to
discern the theme in the cacophony of political understanding. Our
chief resources in this undertaking are the words of the statute and
those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining
direction without a compass.
189. "We are hardly original in recognizing that the meaning of
[§ 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)] is neither obvious nor intuitive." Soft Drink Workers Union
Local 812 v. NLRB (Monarch Long Beach Corp.), 657 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir.

1980).
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read literally, the proviso appears to create a vacuous exception. Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), in conjunction with the publicity
proviso, makes it unlawful for a union to coerce an employer
for a secondary "object," so long as this coercion does not take
the form of publicity for a single protected "purpose."'190 The
problem, however, is that the only protected "purpose" is one
that is inconsistent with the previously discovered "object."
Thus the statute outlaws union campaigns that seek to compel
one firm to cease doing business with another. 9 1 The publicity
proviso then commands that the Board exempt from that class
those campaigns that seek only to truthfully advise the public
of the primary labor dispute. If this were in fact a campaign's
only objective, however, it would not have been unlawful in the
first place, since the campaign could then not have had "an object" of forcing one business to cease trading with another.
There are two ways in which the Board might have avoided
draining the proviso of its content. One way would have been
to find publicity itself possessed of "purpose," separate from
that of the union disseminating it. The other would have been
to admit that a strict reading bf the proviso is impossible, and
to interpret it to allow a union to circulate publicity that in fact
informs the public of the primary dispute, even though the
union's real '"purpose" is secondary. Prior Board cases followed the second alternative, allowing the union to disseminate
truthful publicity that persuaded the public to boycott the
92
secondary firm, as long as the union identified the dispute.
The Board in Delta rejected that approach, yet did not adopt
the first alternative either. Clearly the Board found the union's
purpose to be controlling, since it held the Service Employees
in violation of the Act because they "included" the information
on Delta for a "purpose" other than that of advising the public. 193 The use of the definite article in the proviso's "for the
purpose" clause indeed suggests, as the Board here found, that
190. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1976).
191. Id.
192. K-Mart Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. at 89; Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.LB. at 759.
193. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 7, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161. The impossibility of the Board's reading of the proviso is demonstrated by its interesting treatment of Handbill D. In that handbill the union asserted that it was
bringing the information about Delta to the public's attention in order "to publicize our primary dispute with Statewide." Id. at 4, 111 LR.R.M. (BNA) at
1160. The union here had obviously attempted to come within the proviso by
asserting that it was circulating its appeal for the "purpose" of publicizing its
primary dispute. Far from having that effect, however, the Board took this
statement of the union's as an admission of a forbidden secondary "object." Id.
at 7-8, 111 L.RR.M. (BNA) at 1161.
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only publicity circulated solely for "the" protected purpose is
saved by the proviso. This strict reading, however, threatens to
write the proviso entirely out of the Act, because no campaign
that had a secondary object would ever be rehabilitated by it.
The Board's strict construction -of the proviso is also at
odds with obvious industrial reality. The Board is surely correct in concluding that the union here did not distribute the
challenged information on Delta "for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public" of its primary labor dispute. It is equally
clear, however, that the union did not call for a boycott of Delta
for that "purpose" either. Unions publicize their disputes in order to bring the pressure of organized labor and its supporters
to bear on "unfair" employers and to make it less attractive for
others to deal with them. The union in Delta Air Lines acted
for this "purpose" both when it called for a boycott and when it
distributed truthful information about Delta to support it. Yet
the boycott call by itself would be lawful despite this "purpose,"' 94 while the other publicity renders the whole campaign
unlawful because of it.195 The Board made no attempt to reconcile its reading of the proviso with the line of cases protecting
secondary boycotts,1 96 or with the plain facts of industrial life.
The majority's approach to both the issues of statutory "coercion" and the scope of the publicity proviso suggests that a
reappraisal of the law in this area is necessary. Any attempt to
reform this area of the law must serve at least three purposes.
It must protect "neutral" secondary businesses from serious
7
economic harm to the extent constitutionally permissible;19 it
must do so in a way that comports with labor's right to free
speech;98 and it must seek to integrate this area of the law
more fully into the broader "system of freedom of
expression."19 9
The Labor Act's broad restrictions on union speech often
194. The Administrative Law Judge below felt that the appeal to boycott
Delta on the ground that it was "unfair" and did not "provide AFL-CIO conditions of employment" was "basically not out of line." 263 N.LlRB. No. 153, slip
op. app. IV at 3. The Board did not take issue with this.
195. 263 N.LR.B. No. 153, slip op. at 8, 111 LR.PM. (BNA) at 1161.
196. The case that established the rule that the publicity proviso protects a
call for a total boycott of the secondary firm is Middle S. BroadcastingCo., 133
N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961). The Board has consistently reaffirmed the rule in the intervening years. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.

197. This, of course, was clearly the intent of Congress in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
199. The phrase, of course, is Emerson's. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
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seem at war with developed first amendment doctrine,2 00 and
the two have yet to be wholly reconciled.201 The Supreme
Court has upheld broad restrictions on labor picketing on the
theory that picketing involves more than speech. Picketing is
also conduct, as well as a "signal" to action on the part of
others. 202 This "signal" is said to have effects unrelated to the
ideas expressed in the picket signs.203 At least where handbilling or other publicity does not "amount to picketing," 20 4 however, these rationales are plainly unavailable. Handbills and
newspapers rely entirely on their ideas for their force, 205 and
leave the recipient of the publicity completely free to act in accord with those ideas, or to refuse to do so. Yet because the
courts have not integrated the restraints placed on " pure"
union speech by section 8(b) (4) into modern first amendment
theory, unions find themselves subject to restraints that would
probably be unconstitutional if applied to other organizations.206 Professor Emerson has suggested that the law's hos200. In § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) cases, the Board must examine the content of the
publicity, as well as the circumstances of its distribution, to determine whether
it has a forbidden secondary "object." See DeltaAir Lines, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153,
slip op. at 7, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161. The prohibition of § 8(b) (4) is not triggered unless this object is found. The Act protects "neutral" firms by prohibiting unions from communicating boycott messages. This makes the restriction
one clearly "intended to control the content of speech." Cf. Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). Compare Tribe's statement of the general rule in
cases involving content-based regulations of speech, supra note 68, with the
language in Delta Air Lines, stating that the rule that all union secondary publicity must relate to the primary dispute serves the congressional purpose in
§ 8(b) (4) because it limits a union's ability to "enmesh neutrals in other employers' labor disputes ... as much as possible." 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op.
at 9, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1162. Member Zimmerman refused to construe the
proviso to prohibit publicity that was merely misleading because he was unwilling to "step ... beyond a content-based restriction .... " Id. at 51 n.78,
111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1172 n.78 (Zimmerman, M., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A dissenting judge in Kroger noted that "five members of the
[Supreme] Court in Safeco . . . appear to believe even more strongly [than
the Safeco plurality] that secondary boycott cases such as this one in which
the restriction ... is content-based raise 'difficult First Amendment issues."'
647 F.2d at 640.
201. See T. EMERSON, supra note 199, at 434.
202. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957); Bakery &
Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
203. Bakery & Pastry Drivers, 315 U.S. at 776.
204. Under § 8(b) (4), handbilling does not amount to picketing unless the
handbillers wear placards or march in front of the secondary site. See Lohman
Sales Co., 132 N.L.R.B. at 905; C. MoRxus, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 563
(1971).
205. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title
Ins., Co.), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
206. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-65 (1960) (state may not re-
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tility to secondary boycotts developed before modern first
amendment doctrine, and that much of the law applicable to
boycott publicity is a holdover from a time when free speech
was not vigorously protected in any area. 20 7 This may be the
only explanation for the anamolous treatment of speech under
section 8(b) (4).
A proper adherence to the constitutional principle of free
expression requires a court to carefully scrutinize this section
of the Landrum-Griffin amendments. The statute outlaws
union "coercion" even where the coercion takes the form of
speech.208 The statute also imposes content regulation on "co2 09
ercive" speech even in the form of pure union publicity.
Therefore, both the Board's definition of "coercion" and the
regulations it imposes under the publicity proviso must withstand exacting constitutional scrutiny.2 10 The initial question
of the "coerciveness" of union speech, of course, presents different issues than does the statutory regulation of speech
under the proviso. These two questions may require different
first amendment standards for their resolution. The purpose of
thfs Comment is to suggest answers to both these questions
that would respect the expressive rights of organized labor.
As applied to section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), first amendment doctrine requires a two-step analysis. At the first level of inquiry,
Landrum-Griffin's regulation of "coercive" publicity must invoke the highest level of first amendment scrutiny because the
Act's restraints are content-based. 21 ' Regulation is triggered
only when the union's publicity urges a "secondary boycott." 212
quire distributors of political handbills to identify themselves on the leaflets,
even when these were distributed on the street and called for a boycott of
named businesses who were accused of racist employment practices). See also
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (invalidating licensing requirement
for handbilling); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982)
(political consumer boycott conducted by means of admittediy "coercive"
speech fully protected by the first amendment).
207. See T. EMERSON, supra note 199, at 448-49.
208. See, e.g., Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 62-63; R. GORMAN, supra note 34, at 25862.
209. See cases cited supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 640 (1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("[SIecondary boycott cases such as this one in which the restriction
...
is content-based raise 'difficult First Amendment issues' ...
requiring
the Court 'to determine whether the method or manner of expression, considered in context, justifies the particular restriction."' (citing NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607, 617-18
(Blackmun, J., concurring), 618 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61; supra note 200.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
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Publicity in any form that contains this message is either subjected to content regulation or is banned outright. The Act restricts such expression because of its potential "communicative
impact" on members of the public. 213 The Act prevents the impact by suppressing the message, unless it takes a form "other
than picketing" and conforms to the Board's most recent interpretation of the publicity proviso. Clearly, lowered scrutiny is
not justified because the speech is that of a labor union,2 14 or
because the expression urges a boycott.2 15 Nor may Landrum213. The only rational connection between the protection of neutral employers and the Act's ban on union publicity is one which runs through the minds
of the recipients of that publicity. In this case the handbills were directed at
members of the general public, in hopes of encouraging them to boycott Delta
Air Lines. The handbilling constituted unlawful "coercion" because it constituted an effort to institute a "total consumer boycott." 263 N.L .B. No. 153, slip
op. at 6, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1161.
214. Clearly, labor unions enjoy the right to free speech, and the protection
of the first amendment extends to a variety of labor union "activities" as well
as to pure speech. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct.
2673 (1982). Indeed, in the recent case of Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 51 U.S.L.W. 4165, 4170-71 (Feb. 23, 1983), Justice Brennan in dissent suggested that union speech directed at potential members on labor issues
was "if not at the very apex of any hierachy of protected speech, at least not far
below it." Id. (citing Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1299
(7th Cir. 1981)). The majority did not take issue with this assertion.
215. It seems clear that public dissemination of a boycott message, like the
public dissemination of most other messages, constitutes expression protected
by the first amendment. Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969)
(injunction against a civil rights boycott accompanied by some violence, that
prohibited "persuad[ing] or coerc[ing]" any person to boycott, overturned because it apparently "prohibit[ed] the distribution of leaflets or even speech directed toward the boycott effort"); Kirkland v. Wallace, 403 F.2d 413, 416 (5th
Cir. 1968) (striking down as unconstitutional on its face an Alabama statute
that prohibited the printing or circulation of any boycott message: "Clearly, on
its face, this statute prohibits actions protected by the First Amendment, and
this overbreadth of coverage is fatal"). Even boycotts that are instituted
through means that smack of planned "conspiracy" or private agreement may
find constitutional protection. Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1315-19 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (where women's rights organization
sought to persuade sympathetic groups not to hold conventions in states that
had not ratified the equal rights amendment, actions protected under first
amendment right to petition); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F.
Supp. 759, 769 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980)
(service station dealer's association's organized refusal to sell gasoline to the
public in protest against price regulation held protected "expression"). But see
Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553,
558 (D. Del. 1980) (opposite result on facts similar to those in Crown Central;
group conduct, although expressive, could be regulated by the antitrust laws).
Where a union does no more than disseminate a boycott message to the public
in the form of pure speech, the union is exercising its right of free speech and
is entitled to strict first amendment protection. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 243 (1941) (Stone, J., concurring) ("the publication, unaccom-
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Griffin escape strict review because it only regulates pure
union publicity, and does not totally ban it.216 And surely Congress can gain no greater power over "speech" by the expedient
of relabelling it "coercion." 217 Therefore, at this initial level of
scrutiny, the Act's proscription of union "coercion" is constitutional only if it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest. 218 Where a firm is truly neutral, 19 the government
panied by violence, [by a union] of a notice that the employer is unfair to
organized labor and requesting the public not to patronize him is an exercise of
the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment which cannot be
made unlawful by act of Congress") (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
104-05 (1940)). See also NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001
(Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607, 617-19 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(Congress could constitutionally ban picketing because picketing coerces "neutral employers, employees, and consumers."), (Stevens, J., concurring) (Congress may ban picketing because it is a mixture of conduct and expression: the
conduct provides a '"persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment," while handbills by contrast "depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea."). In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct.
3409 (1982), the Court suggested that secondary boycotts by unions could be
stopped in order to prevent the "coerced participation" of "neutral employers,
employees, and consumers" in industrial strife. Id. at 3425-26. This dicta rather
clearly recites a rationale applicable only to labor boycotts conducted by picketing. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins.
Co.), 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a discussion of the contention that labor boycotts that are likely to be coercive in fact may receive less
constitutional protection than other boycott appeals, see infra text accompanying notes 237-57.
216. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (invalidating Florida statute that required newspapers to give political candidates
space in the paper to reply to editorial attacks: 'The Florida statute operates
as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant
[newspaper] to publish specified matter .... [It] exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper" and thus violates the first amendment); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (opinion of Black, J.), 66-67 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
217. It does not appear that the label "coercion," deserves to fare any better
than other legislative labels in the area of first amendment freedoms.
[W] e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of
state law ... [l]ike insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts,
breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the
various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (footnotes
omitted). See also Jacobelis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
218. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. at 66-67 (Harlan, J., concurring) (invalidating state requirement that handbills contain the identity of group distributing
them: "state action impinging on free speech and association will not be sustained unless the governmental interest asserted to support such impingement
is compelling"). See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 51
U.SJ.W. 4165, 4167 (Feb. 23, 1983) ("For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
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may indeed have a compelling interest in protecting it from serious economic harm flowing from labor disputes that do not
concern it. The state may pursue this goal, however, only by
narrowly regulating that speech which is likely to cause this
harm. 220 The Board's very broad, per se approach to coercion
must fail at the first level of inquiry, because it burdens all
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."); Consolidated
Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Carpenter's Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. at 727-28. See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of
Non-Commercial Boycotters: A Delicate Balance, 10 HOFSTRA L REV. 773
(1982). The author of this Note recognizes the constitutional right to publicize
a boycott, but argues that the courts have focused on this right exclusively
while ignoring the valid interests of "neutral" parties who become helpless victims of noncommercial boycotts. Id. at 775-76. For the purposes of the Note, a
noncommercial boycott is one in which the boycotters are not business entities
and are not acting in concert for profit. Cf. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion Originator's Guild, Inc., v. FT'C, 312 U.S.
457, 467-68 (1941). The author argues that the interest of neutrals should be
considered in determining the constitutional status of a boycott. The Note proposes an acceptable definition of neutrality. A business is neutral in a dispute
if it has not engaged in the conduct which led to the dispute and does not have
the power to directly satisfy the boycotter's demands. Note, supra, at 777 n.20.
The courts have not applied this reasonable definition of neutrality, however, to
the labor field. Many cases found to involve secondary consumer boycotts
under the Act are those in which the "neutral" party has chosen to hire a nonunion contractor. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 4,
111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1160; K-Mart Corp., 257 N.LR.B. at 87; The Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. at 703; Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. at 259. The
case that makes the head contractor a "neutral" in any dispute between a
union and a subcontractor, even though the "neutral" has engaged in the challenged conduct (hiring the sub) and has the power to correct it, is the famous
(or infamous) Denver Building case, NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). That decision has been the subject of intense controversy, and the object of labor effort aimed at legislative reversal for thirty
years. R. GonmAI, supra note 34, at 253. In 1975, both Houses of Congress
passed legislation overruling that case as applied to the construction trades,
but President Ford vetoed the legislation. Id. at 253-54. The purpose of this
Comment is to suggest a standard for both statutory "coercion" and the scope
of the publicity proviso that would comport with the statute and the Constitution. Therefore, Delta Air Lines has been treated as if it involved a paradigm
case of secondary activity in which the targeted firm is truly "neutral" because
it has not engaged in the challenged conduct and has no power to satisfy the
boycotter's demands. Quite plainly it does not, because Delta Air Lines was
not neutral in either of these senses. Because first amendment doctrine requires a court to examine the state interest asserted to determine whether it is
"compelling," a court should not uphold this section of the Labor Act as applied
to cases of consumer boycotts in which the secondary firm is not in fact "neutral" because it has engaged in the challenged conduct and may lawfully satisfy
the boycotter's ultimate demands. See Cox, supra, note 182, at 38-39; Note,
supra, at 775-76.
220. See supra note 183.
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union secondary publicity whether the appeal is likely to cause
serious harm to the neutral firm or not.
As the history of the Tree Fruits case demonstrates, there
are basically three approaches to the initial issue of "coercion
or restraint" under section 8(b) (4) (ii).221 Of these, only the approach taken by the circuit court appears to present a standard
that can be broadly applied to "pure" secondary boycott publicity consistently with both the statute and the Constitution. The
state interest supporting the Labor Act's restraint on union
speech is the prevention of actual and substantial coercive
harm to neutral businesses. 222 The Labor Board may neither
simply presume the existence of harm in every case, nor presume that harm to be serious. 223 For the prohibition on coercive harm to be constitutional, the likelihood of such harm
must be found as a fact. Therefore, as the circuit court suggested in Tree Fruits, the Board may not constitutionally find a
union liable for "coercion or restraint" unless its publicity has
caused, or is likely to cause, substantial economic harm to the
224
secondary business.
Moreover, there must be an exception to this general rule.
Internal union propaganda directed solely at union members
should never be labelled unlawfully "coercive." The actual coercive effects of such materials, even when widely distributed
within a large union, are likely to be minimal. The state's interest in suppression is clearly outweighed by important rights of
unionists, both statutory and constitutional. Section 7 of the
Labor Act gives all employees the statutory right to form, join,
and assist labor organizations, and to engage in other concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protection.225 The Act also
declares that employees shall enjoy "full freedom of associa221. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
222. See Cox, supra note 182, at 38-39.
223. See supra notes 183, 210.
224. Cf. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title
Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. at 611-15; Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308
F.2d at 317.
225. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
....
The term "employee" includes "any employee, and [is] not ... limited
to the employees of a particular employer.., and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The Labor Act policy statement also
expresses Congress's intent that the Act shall protect "full freedom of association" for workers. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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tion."226 Effective concerted activity is not possible unless a
union may communicate freely with its membership. Even if
the Labor Act did not exist, the constitutional right to free association would forbid the government from interfering with the
internal communications of labor unions except when an important government policy would otherwise be greatly impeded, and no less intrusive methods for promoting that policy
are available. 227 It could hardly be contended that suppression
of internal union communications is the least intrusive means
of protecting neutral businesses.
There are, of course, objections to the use of the "substantial harm" test in all other cases of secondary publicity. It
would, for example, increase the Board's administrative burden
by requiring it to find, on the basis of a showing in every case,
that the campaign was likely to cause substantial economic injury. The Board's expertise in this area should, however, enable it to handle this burden.228 Section 303 of the Act 229 also
226.
227.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

(Harlan, J.):
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech ....

Of course, it is immaterial

whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny.
Id. at 460-61. Plainly, the right to communicate freely within the organization is
one of the cornerstones of free association. It is difficult to imagine a more effective or insidious method of impairing the effectiveness and integrity of an organization than by forbidding its members to speak freely to one another. The
Court has frequently recognized this in the labor context. Even when the state
pursues an otherwise valid objective, internal interference with a union will be
invalid unless the state shows that a serious impairment of that objective
would clearly result from abandonment of the regulation, and that no less intrusive means would serve the state's purpose. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223-25 (1967) (invalidating state's attempt to
prevent unions from referring members to union attorneys); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964) (same). In United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121-24 (1948), the Court narrowly construed an act of
Congress forbidding union political contributions so as not to outlaw political
endorsements in union magazines. Four Justices thought the act applied to forbid such internal propaganda and was therefore unconstitutional as applied.
Id. at 129-30. See T. EMERSON, supra note 199, at 425-37; L TRImE, supra note 58,
§ 12-23; Note, Freedom of Speech in a Commercial Contex 78 HARv. L REv.
1191, 1193 (1965).
228. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title
Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980), holding that secondary picketing of the Tree
Fruits type which merely "follows the struck product" may nevertheless be
outlawed where the Board finds that the appeal "is reasonably likely to
threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss." The Court added,
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provides a strong incentive to the secondary firm to aid the
general counsel in collecting relevant evidence. That section
gives the injured firm a cause of action against a union for business lost due to violations of section 8(b) (4). More fundamentally, of course, administrative convenience is not itself
sufficient reason for abridging the fundamental right of free
0
speech. 23
It has also been argued that 0this approach is unacceptable
because it would outlaw only successful boycotts.231 This argument may point up the constitutional problems inherent in the
statutory scheme, but it hardly presents a justification for labelling all union publicity coercive per se. Only campaigns that
are likely to succeed are likely to "coerce." There is no valid
state interest in suppressing any others. In practice,
moreoever, adoption of the "substantial harm" test would not
restrain only successful boycotts. It would burden all those
that the Labor Board prospectively found "likely" to succeed.
This last point, however, raises perhaps the most serious
objection to the use of the "substantial harm" criterion. The
test is at best imprecise, and thus fails to give much firm guidance to the Board, or to provide courts with a clear standard
against which to measure Board decisions. Courts should not
adopt a reading of a legislative delegation that would grant
agencies broad discretion to abridge constitutional rights, at
least where another reading is fairly possible. 232 A revival of
"Resolution of the question in each case will be entrusted to the Board's expertise." Id. at 615-16 n.11.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
230. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) ("administrative ease and
convenience" insufficient justification for abridging the right to equal protection
of the laws); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (same); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
231. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 199, at 447; Note, supra note 227, at
1208.
232. In a leading case, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958), the Court narrowly construed a legislative delegation to the Secretary of State so as not to
permit the Secretary to deny passports to those who refused to sign a nonCommunist affidavit. The legislative delegation was in terms extremely broad,
permitting the Secretary to "grant and issue passports... under such rules
as the President shall designate and prescribe." Id. at 123. The Court stated:
We ...

hesitate to impute to Congress ...

a purpose to give [the

Secretary] unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a
citizen for any substantive reason he may choose ....
[T] he right of
exit is a personal right included in the word "liberty" as used in the
Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress ....

And if that power is

delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests

. . .

.

[W]e will construe narrowly all delegated powers

that curtail or dilute [protected "liberties"].
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the "constitutional fact" doctrine, moreover, is not an attractive
solution to this problem. 2 33 If the Board were to adopt the
"substantial harm" criterion for "coercion" under section
8(b) (4), its discretion would best be controlled by court-imposed rules of decision based on the statute and on the Constitution itself.2m Thus, a court should impose clear rules under
the publicity proviso to ensure that the Board respects the free
speech rights of unions and their members. On the other hand,
if the Board continues to follow its present, broad approach to
coercion or restraint, the publicity proviso's "exception" takes
on even greater constitutional significance. Section 8(b) (4)
cannot constitutionally be interpreted to give the Labor Board
"unbridled discretion" 235 to suppress all union secondary publicity that fails to conform to any regulations the Board imposes. A court must examine those regulations to determine if
they conform with the Constitution. 236 Therefore, no matter
what reading of "coercion" the Board adopts, its regulation of
Id. at 128-29. See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103-05 (1976); T.
TarBE, supra note 58, at 1137-46.
233. The "constitutional fact doctrine" was articulated in Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932). The doctrine held that an article I court in reviewing
an administrative factual conclusion must try de novo all facts decisive of constitutional rights. See Strong, The PersistentDoctrine of "ConstitutionalFact,"
46 N.C.L. REv. 222, 222 (1968). The doctrine has been severly criticized because
it makes the agency's factfinding irrelevant and because "no one has ever succeeded in ascertaining the difference between fundamental ... facts and
other facts." L DAvis, ADmiNsTRATIVE LAW TExT, § 29.08 (3d ed. 1972). The
doctrine now appears to have "earned a deserved repose." Id. (quoting Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.)). The modern rule appears to be that "de novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate factflnding procedures in an [agency's] adjudicatory proceeding." Camp
v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)). An agency's factflnding will generally be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. K. DAVis, supra, § 29.01. Specifically,
the Labor Act directs that a reviewing court shall uphold the factual conclusions of the Board if supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951).
234. See supra note 232. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58
(1965) (State Board of Censors may suppress films for obscenity only if a judicial determination in an adversary hearing is promptly sought in which the
constitutional standard for obscenity will be applied); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
235. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 128. See also Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) ("Invariably, the Court has felt obliged to
condemn systems in which the exercise of [censoring] authority was not
bound by precise and clear standards .... [T]he danger of censorship and of
abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use.").
236. See supra notes 232-35; infra text accompanying notes 255-57.
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''coercive" publicity must itself be subject to judicial scrutiny
under the first amendment.
Congress added the publicity proviso in order to protect
the expressive liberties of organized labor.237 The Labor Board
has traditionally read the language of the proviso broadly so
that it might effectively serve this function.238 The Board, Congress, and the Supreme Court239 have recognized that even "coercive" boycott publicity is entitled to some constitutional
protection. In order to determine how much protection the first
amendment affords such speech, however, courts must attempt
to place the public boycott appeals of labor unions within the
larger system of free expression. This is a task that they have
yet to perform.
Union speech as such clearly cannot be subjected to
greater restrictions than the speech of other private organizations.240 Nevertheless, when a union calls for a boycott and its
message is "coercive," unions fall under far stricter regulation
than do organizations that boycott in support of social or political goals.24 1 The Supreme Court, for only the vaguest of reasons, has recently suggested in dicta that this differential
237. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
239. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982), involved a
civil rights boycott in which boycott supporters, among other things, wrote
down the names of boycott violators and published them in local community
newspapers. The names were also read aloud in the local churches. Id. at 3424.
Without dissent, the Supreme Court found these actions protected by the first
amendment. "Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott through social pressure and 'threat' of social ostracism. Speech does not
lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others
or coerce them into action." Id. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), the Court held that employer speech likely to coerce employees in the
choice of a bargaining agent may be outlawed by the Board. Id. at 619-20. The
rationale for the Gissel rule is that employees are economically dependent on
the employer and thus are easily coerced by an employer's expression. Id. at
617-18. Moreover, the employer's first amendment rights had to be weighed
against the right of employees to freedom of association. Id. at 617. But Gissel
seems distinguishable from the case of secondary union boycott publicity on a
far more fundamental level. The Gissel rule is part of the Board's effort to
maintain "laboratory conditions" in the conduct of elections by strictly regulating the campaign speech of the antagonists. See Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962). Whatever the merits of the Board's stringent control of the electioneering of the parties, surely the Board is not empowered to
impose "laboratory conditions" on the entire society in order to protect secondary firms from merely emotional pressure.
240. See, e.g, Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (Government
"may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas."').
241. See ClaiborneHardware Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3424-26.
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treatment of speech is constitutional. 242 If so, this must be because union boycott appeals are a form of economic expression. 243 Such union appeals are primarily aimed at inducing
private economic decisions that would promote the economic
rather than the political goals of the speaker.244 This is perhaps
the reason courts tend to draw an analogy between speech in
the labor context and "commercial speech," 245 and grant the
state far more power to regulate industrial disputes than political ones. 24 6 If so, the courts should make that analogy explicit,
examining it carefully and candidly to determine the extent to
which it truly supports the restrictions found in the Labor Act.
Only by doing so can courts integrate labor law fully into
modern first amendment doctrine.
The analogy between union boycott appeals and commercial speech is in some ways an attractive one. As Professor
Cox has pointed out, both promotional advertising and union
boycott messages urge some action on the part of the consumer
247
Of
that would promote the speaker's economic interests.
course the fact that a speaker's motivation is partly economic
does not, standing alone, lower the status of expression under
the first amendment. 248 Where, however, that motivation dominates and the speaker's conduct is likely in fact to cause some
242. Id. at 3425-26. See supra note 215; infra note 246.
243. See Cox, supra note 182, at 38-39.
244. Id.
245. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). The Court in this foundational "commercial speech" decision alluded to speech in the labor context to make the point
that economically motivated speech was not thereby deprived of first amendment protection. See Co, supra note 182, at 39. The Court asserted that "[t]he
interests of the contestants in a labor dispute are primarily economic." 425 U.S.
at 762. See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).
246. See ClaiborneHardware Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3425-26. In seeking to distinguish labor boycotts and picketing from political or social boycotts, the Court
stated that restrictions on such labor activities were justified partially by "the
strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation." Id. at
3425. Part of the rationale was that such activity "may have a disruptive effect
on local economic conditions." Id. That, however, seems a far better description of the activity the Court protected in Claiborne than the labor picketing
condemned in Safeco. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001
(Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980).
247. Cox, supra note 182, at 38-39.
248. See supra note 245. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring), Justice Stevens
emphasized that a speaker's economic motivation should not "qualify his constitutional protection." According to Stevens, "Economic motivation could not
be made a disqualifying factor [from maximum protection] without enormous
damage to the first amendment." Id. at n.2 (quoting Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REv. 372, 382-83 (1979)
(bracketed material added by Justice Stevens)).
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harm the state may avert, 249 the balance of interests appears to
shift in favor of the government's regulatory power.
A number of factors, however, counsel against the wholesale application of the "commercial speech doctrine" to union
boycott publicity. Labor unions do.not exist purely to raise
their members' wages the way corporations exist to increase
the income of their shareholders. Unions also express the social, political, and economic viewpoint of wage earners. Their
boycott messages are usually explicit appeals for solidarity
within the labor movement.2 50 Thus, only those portions of a
boycott appeal that directly touch the private economic interests of the union and its adversary may be regulated under a
commercial speech rationale. Union expression that attacks an
employer's product as shoddy, dangerous, or otherwise economically unattractive should be subject to regulation under
commercial speech standards. Here the analogy between corporate advertising and union counter-advertising is a close
one.25 1 On the other hand, expression of the political, social, or
economic grievances of organized labor, even where the speech
attacks an employer's business or labor policies in the process,
should not be subject to such regulation. Thus, if a union accuses an employer of contributing to high unemployment or of
union busting or of using "scab" products, such expression
should be subject to no stricter standard than that announced
in New York Times v. Sullivan. 52 Where a union seeks to
249. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
250. In Delta Air Lines, 263 N.L.IRB. No. 153, slip op. app. III, the union
asked the public not to fly Delta "[ijf you are concerned about the plight of fellow union members." See also Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. at 762, where the
union complained in its handbills:
[W hen large "consumers" of construction services like WISCONSIN
TELEPHONE COMPANY gives [sic] their business to non-union contractors like OAK CONSTRUCTION, INC. the entire trade union movement is threatened. Because OAK workers do not have wages and
working conditions guaranteed by union contract, OAK can promise
"flexibility" and reduced costs-at the expense of workers, of course.
If construction work for large companies moves toward non-union
outfits, union workers will have to dilute contract standards or face unemployment-already at outrageous levels in this community.
See also The Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. at 703, where the union
suggested that low, nonunion wages might be justified if the secondary firms
were willing to lower the prices in their stores in accord with the low wages.
251. See Cox, supra note 182, at 39. See generally Collins, Counter-Advertising in the BroadcastMedia: Bringing the Administrative Process to Bear Upon
a Theoretical Imperative, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 799 (1974).
252. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that
the New York Times standard is not the appropriate one to apply to defamation
suits by private persons against the media, even where the allegedly defamatory statements occur in connection with the discussion of public issues. See
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make an employer's product politically rather than economically unattractive, the first amendment and the Labor Act contemplate robust and wide open debate. 253 Thus the Board in
such cases may suppress only defamatory or disparaging material published with reckless disregard of the truth.254
The Supreme Court has recently formulated a test for commercial speech that outlines an "intermediate" level of scrutiny
for government regulation of advertising. Because the analogy
between corporate advertising and some labor counter-advertising is a close one, this intermediate level of scrutiny should
be applied to the Board's regulation of speech under the publicity proviso. Under the standards announced in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric"Corp. v. Public Service Commission,2 5 a regulation of the commercial aspects of corporate speech will be valid
Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974). A number of factors,
however, make Gertz inapplicable to the case of labor boycott propoganda that
attacks an employer's labor policies and practices. A major rationale for the
Gertz decision was the view that private individuals are far more vulnerable to
injury than public officials, because private persons do not have the ready access to the media that such officials enjoy. Id. at 344. At least in cases such as
Delta Air Lines, the corporation clearly has such access and generally uses it
as often as possible to tout the advantages and the attractiveness of its product.
Labor boycott messages urging rejection of products tend to be continuously
and skillfully countered by the corporate advertising that urges acceptance of
those products. Moreover, one of the major reasons that any defamation law is
constitutional is that defamatory statements usually form "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942), and thus are entitled to less constitutional protection. Professor Tribe
has suggested that another reason may be that defamation law is "ideologically
neutral" in that the compensation of individuals for defamation does not turn
on "whether the government approves or disapproves of the content of the
message." L. TRmE, supra note 58, at 641. Obviously neither of these reasons
supports relaxation of the New York Times standard in the labor area. Where a
union urges a boycott because of an employer's labor policies or because the
employer has chosen to deal with labor's opponents, that message is at the
very core of its appeal to the public for solidarity in labor's cause. In addition,
the government here is clearly not ideologically neutral. It has forbidden the
exposition of certain ideas by one party to an economic dispute, and has to that
extent taken sides. Finally, part of the Court's rationale in Gertz may be that
the "chilling effect" of the possibility of tort suits against the media is not so
great as to warrant increasing the exposure of private persons to media defamation. 418 U.S. at 390-92 (White, J., dissenting). This rationale for lowered
first admendment protection is plainly not justified where the "chill" on expression stems not from the remote possibility of a court suit, but from the nearcertain suppression of particular messages by the federal government.
253. See Linn v. United Plan Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1966), where
the Court noted that the Board "has allowed wide latitude to the competing
parties" in the area of speech, and "tolerates intemperate, abusive and inaccurate statements." The Labor Act, however, did not preempt state libel actions
when statements fell afoul of the New York Times standard. Id. at 65.
254. Id.
255. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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only if such regulation "directly advances" a substantial government interest, and "is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest."2 56 Applying this analysis to the publicity proviso to section 8(b) (4), the issue becomes whether the
regulations imposed by the Board under the proviso directly
serve the state interest in protecting neutral firms, and are
"narrowly drawn" 257 to do so.
The first major requirement the proviso imposes on pure
union publicity is that the union inform the public of the secondary nature of its dispute.2 5 8 The union must identify relatively
clearly the role the secondary firm has played. The state's interest in protecting neutrals from secondary consumer boycotts
rests largely on considerations of fairness. 259 The contentbased identification requirement directly serves the state's interest in protecting neutral businesses from unfair union tactics by compelling the union to inform the public of the
neutrality of the targeted firm. Neutrals are thus protected to
the extent that the public sympathizes with their interests.
This is all the secondary firm can demand on grounds of fairness. The union is nevertheless allowed to make its appeal and
explain its position. Consumers and members of the general
public are then left free to make an informed choice and are
not, as is sometimes charged, compelled by state-imposed ignorance to enter the fray on the side of the employer.2 60 Moreover, no less restrictive means of ensuring that the public is
informed of the true nature of the labor dispute, at the moment
256. Id.
257. 477 U.S. at 565. This is true not because "overbroad" legislation may
"chill" some protected speech, but simply because government regulation of
even purely commercial speech must go no further than necessary to serve the
state's interest. Id. at 565 n.8. See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381

(1977).
258.

The proviso directs that "nothing...

shall be construed to prohibit

publicity... for the purpose of truthfully advising the public" of the nature of
the union's primary dispute. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976).
259. See Cox, upra note 182, at 38-39.
260. We take a long and backward step when we illegalize consumer
picketing. It is not enough to say that the union can make its appeal by
newspaper advertisements and leaflet distribution. Advertisements
are expensive, and both may be ineffective to quickly, and dramatically
catch the public's eye. Picketing is usually the only effective way of
reaching the consumer at the only place where it matters-where the
product is sold and at the time that the customer is interested in buymg it. When we prohibit consumer picketing we compel the public,
through ignorance of the situation, to side with the employer rather
than the union. We prevent the consumer from making his [or her]
own choice.
105 CONG. REc. 17,883 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse).
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when it is important that they be informed, seems available. 261
The Supreme Court has recognized that affirmative regulations
of this sort may be imposed on commercial speech where they
directly serve the state interest asserted, and that such restrictions are far less burdensome than repression. 262 Such regulations serve the state's interests without harming the public's
interest in full, free, and informed discussion. 263 Thus the proviso's identification requirement is narrowly drawn to serve the
state's interest, and does so without restricting the free flow of
2 4
ideas. It therefore appears to pass constitutional muster. 6
The second major requirement that the proviso imposes on
union publicity is that it be "truthful."265 This requirement
may clearly be imposed on commercial advertising, and advertising may be prohibited even where it is merely "misleading."2 66 The application of the latter branch of the commercial
speech doctrine to union publicity, however, reveals a weakness in the analogy. The constitutionality of bans on "misleading" advertising appears to turn on two related considerations.
One is that the manufacturer or seller of a product is intimately
familiar with its characteristics, and that both the seller and
the legal system itself may verify claims about products or
services objectively. 267 Obviously the same cannot be said
about claims made for political candidates, for example. 2 68 Secondly, Professor Daniel Farber has suggested that these restrictions on commercial advertising comport with the first
amendment because they are simply an outgrowth of familiar
contractual principles. 269 When a commercial speaker '"proposes a commercial transaction" 270 it implicitly warrants that
261. Cf. L TRmE, supra note 58, at 799 (suggesting that political campaign
literature identification requirements should be constitutional partly because
"the interest in providing voters with information that will permit them better
is not ...
readily protected by other
to assess campaign literature ...
means").
262. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71, where the Court struck down a
ban on all advertising intended to stimulate demand for utility services. The
Court noted that among the "more limited regulation[s]" available was a "require[ment] that the advertisements include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service." Id. at 571. See also Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
263. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 571; Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
264. See L. TRME, supra note 58, at 799.
265. See supra note 258.
266. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 565-66; Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
267. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
268. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379-81.
269. Farber, supra note 248, at 386-87.
270. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
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its claims about a product are true. The speaker must stand
ready to answer in damages if an offeree is, as a reasonable
person, induced to purchase a product on misleading premises. 271 Thus, regulation of this form of commercial speech is
plainly constitutional because it relates only to the "contractual
function of speech." 272 The use of speech to form a contract is
thus "not the sort of 'speech' to which the first amendment
273
applies."
To the extent these are the reasons that bans on misleading advertising are constitutional, the analogy between boycott
appeals and pure commercial speech fails. Although facts
about products may be objectively verifiable, this is of little
help to a speaker who has no access to the relevant data. Employers cannot normally be expected to turn over business data
to their labor adversaries, and unions will therefore generally
be denied access to them. Moreover, in proposing that the public refuse to enter a commercial transaction, unions make no
implied warranty that their appeal has not "misled" anyone to
that refusal. The Board has implicitly recognized this in the
past, holding that the union is in no way an "insurer" of the 100
percent accuracy of its assertions. 2 74 Finally, the term "misleading" is vague and potentially very broad, thus reviving
problems of agency discretion. 275 Therefore the strictest standard of truthfulness that the Board may impose on union secondary publicity consistently with the first amendment seems
to be embodied in the Board's traditional definition of "truthfulness." The Board may not suppress union publicity that is
"substantially accurate" and not distributed with an 'Intent to
deceive." 276 This requirement protects secondary firms from
unfair disparagement without restricting the flow of substantially true information. Because the rationale supporting the
constitutionality of very strict bans on "misleading" advertising
does not apply to union messages, however, the Board may not
277
impose this further requirement.
Finally, the Board's rule in Delta Air Lines must be examined under the standards set out above. The Board's read271. Farber, supra note 248, at 387.
272. Id. at 389.
273. Id. at 387.
274. The case that established this principle is Teamsters, Local 537 (Jack
Lohman d/b/a/ Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 905 (1961).
275. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
276. Lohman Sales Co., 132 N.L.R.B. at 905-06.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 265-76.
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ing of the proviso led it to suppress wholly truthful information
about a commercial service that the Board assumed was not
even misleading as to Delta's relative safety. The union did not
ask consumers to do anything unlawful, nor did it seek to compel unlawful action by the secondary firm. 27 8 Suppression of
the truth in such circumstances can only be justified by appeal
to the "benefits of public ignorance." 2 79 No court can allow
such an appeal to succeed unless some very grave social consequences would follow from free expression. 280 The danger of a

boycott is not the sort of social emergency that might justify repression.281 Moreover, the state has no valid interest in keeping the public ignorant of Delta's safety record. On the
contrary, the Constitution assumes that the public interest is
282
best served by the free flow of commercial information.
Thus, even as applied to purely commercial advertising, the
278. In Safeco Title Ins. Co., 447 U.S. at 616, the Supreme Court dismissed
the union's claim that its consumer picketing was protected by the first amendment by simply stating that bans on "picketing in furtherance of... unlawful
objectives" does not offend the first amendment. As Professor Cox has pointed
out, the "object" of union secondary boycotts such as those in Safeco and Delta
Air Lines is "'unlawful' only in a Pickwickian sense." Cox, supra note 182, at
36. There are a number of ways in which a union's "object" may be unlawful.
It may ask consumers to do something they may not lawfully do, cf. Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. at 759-60, or it may seek to compel unlawful action on the
part of the secondary employer, cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. at 501-03. In cases like Delta Air Lines and Safeco, however, the union's
object is not unlawful in either of these senses. Congress has not forbidden
one firm to "cease doing business with another." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B)
(1976). Nor is it illegal for consumers to withhold patronage from a secondary
employer. Where the union neither requests nor seeks to compel unlawful action on the part of anyone, its claims to first amendment protection are far
more substantial than in other cases. See Note, supra note 227, at 1208-11.
279. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (Striking down a prohibition
on advertising by lawyers: "[W]e view as dubious any justification that is
based on the benefits of public ignorance."). See also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70
(1976).
280. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court
struck down a ban on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in a residential
area that had been imposed to prevent racial "block busting," despite the circuit court's findings that a "fear psychology" and "'incipient' panic selling" had
developed. Id. at 91, 95-98. The Court cited with approval the famous Brandeis
concurrence to Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927): "If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." See also Virginia
State B of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 770.
281. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3424-26. Cf.
Linmark Associates, 431 U.S. at 95-98; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 701-02 (1977).
282. See CentralHudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770): "'[P]eople will perceive their own best
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first amendment presumes that some truthful information is
better than none at all. Any principled application of first
amendment doctrine, whether that applicable to product advertising or the modified form of that standard proposed by this
Comment, leads to a rejection of the Board's approach in Delta
Air Lines and a reaffirmation of the free speech rights of labor.
Applying the analysis suggested above to the facts of Delta,
the Board clearly had no evidence on the threshold issue of
whether the union's handbilling "coerced" Delta. The Board
sought no evidence tending to show whether the union's campaign caused or was likely to cause substantial economic injury
to Delta, and the airline produced none. The case should have
been remanded for evidence on this issue. The advertisements
in the union's newspapers, however, should have been found
non-coercive per se and thus beyond the reach of section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B). Clearly the Board should not have suppressed
the union's newspaper messages on these facts. 283
If the Board were to find the union's campaign "coercive"
under the proposed test, however, the distribution of Handbills
A and B would be unlawful. These handbills failed to identify
the primary dispute and thus could not claim the protection of
the publicity proviso. Handbills C and D, however, should have
received that protection. They identified the primary dispute
and contained only "truthful" information. The Service Employees Union could hardly be accused of acting with "an intent to deceive" in publishing material they received from the
federal government. The fact that the handbills and newspaper
advertisements "attacked" Delta Air Lines does not supply sufficient justification for the suppression of truthful information
284
about products or services.
This approach to secondary boycott publicity in the form of
pure speech would help integrate labor law into modern first
amendment doctrine. It would respect the rights of labor organizations and their members to free expression, and protect
neutral business from injurious falsehood to the extent constitutionally permissible.28 5 First amendment principles presupinterests if only they are well enough informed, and... the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them."'
283. Cf. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718-20 (1931).
284. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 364-65; Linmark Associates,Inc., 431 U.S. at 96.
285. Unlike the Labor Board's standard for liability under § 8(b)(4), injurious falsehood and product disparagement is not actionable at common law unless the plaintiff proves damages resulting from the challenged speech. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 128 (4th ed. 1971).
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pose a mature population capable of recognizing interested
communications and acting on them as they think best. The
Board and the courts should reaffirm this faith in the public in
consumer boycott cases, because the identification requirement
will give the public the tools they need to make just such an
evaluation. When the Board suppresses messages and information merely because "the group in power" 286 would rather
they were not heard, it charts a course that was rejected two
hundred years ago by those who saw where it would lead. The
choice "between the dangers of suppressing information, and
the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available" is, in the last
28 7
analysis, one "that the First Amendment makes for us."

286. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940):
Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another
group in society. But the group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of
public interest merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests .... We hold that
the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither so serious nor
so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion embodied in [an Alabama statute that prohibited all
"[1]oitering or picketing ... with intent of influencing, or inducing
other persons not to ... have business dealings" with another].
Id.
287. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 770.

